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Abstract
For different model settings we conduct power analyses on the Florentine families network
of the 15th century while referring to the most popular power indices like the Shapley-Shubik
or Banzhaf value as well as to the pre-nucleolus and pre-kernel. In order to assess their ca-
pacity to identify the main protagonists that correspond with the chronicles, we inspect of
how the power distributions are spread around the mean. Distributions that are clustered to
close around the mean cannot identify outstanding positions. In this respect, they failed to
provide a scenario that corresponds with the annals. As it turns out, the pre-kernel solution
– as a solution concept designed for studying bargaining situations – retrieves the most accu-
rate image for the examined network structures. Last but not least, we discovered two new
non-homogeneous weighted majority games with a disconnected pre-kernel.
Keywords: Transferable Utility Game, (Non-)Homogeneous Game, Disconnected Pre-Kernel,
Convex Analysis, Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation, Pre-Nucleolus, Shapley-Shubik Index, Banzhaf
Value, Deegan-Packel Index, Johnston Index, Public Good Index.
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1 Introduction
During the last years one observed a growing interest across disciplines into the Florentine fam-
ilies network. Representatively, we just want to mention the work of Bozzo et al. (2015) in
Computer Science, of Ostoic (2018) in Physics, of Krause and Caimo (2019) in Statistics, as well
as Fronzetti Colladon and Naldi (2020) in Engineering. Each of these mentioned treatises uses
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a different approach to study for the late medieval and early Renaissance the mesh of relations
among the leading families of the Republic of Florence. In particular, Bozzo et al. (2015) used
a seasoned concept in Graph Theory, namely of graph regularizability, to make the connection
to a vulnerability measure to quantify the tendency of a set of actors of the network to be the
potential victims of some group of executioners. This measure is contrasted with a symmetric
power measure that assesses the capacity of a set of actors to play the executioners. As they
established, both measure concepts are supermodular functions which allow to determine the
solution by suitable polynomial algorithms. These supermodular functions define suitable coali-
tional games on the node sets of the network that can be studied by the Shapley value, as the
authors demonstrated on some small examples. Unfortunately, the authors give no answer of how
to apply the Shapley value on the Florentine families network.
Although network analysis is at the heart of game theory, it is quite astonishing that the
Florentine families network of the 15th century with business and marriage ties did not find over
the recent decades any attention. This is all the more surprising under the consideration that
game theory provides a vast box of instruments to investigate such a network structure. Rather
to test these solution concepts on real outcomes as, for instance, in the tradition of studying the
sharing rules applied in the Talmud (see Aumann and Maschler (1985)), some preferred to get
bogged down in wrong logic (cf. Meinhardt (2016a,b, 2017a,b, 2019)). It is the remarkable merit
of Holler and Rupp (2020) to attract attention of game theory on this topic. These authors depict
by the public good index an approach of how to investigate the marriage and business relations
of those 16 families as they were selected by Breiger and Pattison (1986). Guided by a special
focus on the House of Medici, they presented rankings on this data set.
In the course of our investigation we resume their approach, but extends it twofold. On the
one hand, we conduct a power analysis while referring to the most popular power indices apart
of the public good index, that is, the Banzhaf value, Shapley-Shubik, Deegan-Packel or Johnston
index, as well as to the pre-nucleolus and pre-kernel. Note that for the class of monotonic directed
simple games the latter two solution concepts coincide with the nucleolus and kernel, respectively
(cf. Peleg et al. (1994, Cor. 2.7)). In accordance with the fact that we are referring to the
associated procedure of determining the pre-nucleolus or pre-kernel, we prefer to use this prefix to
mark the distinction On the other hand, we do not only take account of a symmetric weighting of
the families, but also of an asymmetric power weighting while considering the net-wealth situation
as well as the cumulated number of marriage and business ties across the 116 families from the
Padgett’s data set. In particular, including the cumulated ties into the game models provide a
more accurate scenario of identifying the major protagonists from the annals.
Even under this more accurate scenario, the power indices failed in general to provide an
accurate picture that corresponds with the chronicles. This is mainly due that a power index
distribution is clustered to close around the mean, which is caused by the fact that they base
their rule of distributive justice (axioms) to close on the principle of equality. In such a situation
all actors are similar strong and none of them exert potential power over others to influence an
outcome of a political decision making process in her/his favor. Under this consideration, it is not
justified to classify an actor as outstanding in accordance with the historical accounts. Almost the
same is the situation for the pre-nucleolus, though it is mainly based on bargaining considerations,
coincides with the Talmudic rule, and is part of the pre-kernel.
Contrasted to these results, the pre-kernel presents the most accurate image. This may surprise
many. However, what consider those as a conceptual defect of this solution concept, – namely, that
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it is in general a set-solution and not single-valued – turns from a disadvantage into an advantage.
Since, a set-valued pre-kernel offers a wide range of possible outcomes on which the bilateral claims
are balanced among each pair of players. Offering a wide range of political settlements on which
parties could agree upon in order to equilibrate their interests. Implying that the pre-kernel
solution ought to be best adapted for a milieu where the political institutions – as in the case of
the Florentine Republic – were oriented toward equalizing the interests among the parties. May
be some consider an exposed part of the pre-kernel as unapologetic or ruthless, but it reflects a
snippet of the actual negotiating power of parties. And in this range the most powerful are able
to enforce their interests, whereas weaker parties may not point to a claim that goes beyond their
outside option, since there are no allies who support their claims. Nevertheless, there may exist
also ranges within a pre-kernel solution, where the principle of equality is of higher prominence,
putting therefore a higher weight to those allocations that distribute the power closer to the mean.
Thus, the pre-kernel covers even a wide variety of fairness considerations, which makes it to an
attractive tool to settle divergent interests. As a byproduct of this analysis, we detected two new
non-homogeneous weighted majority games with a disconnected pre-kernel. There are only a few
known games with a disconnected pre-kernel. To the best of our knowledge, all of these examples
originated from the work of Kopelowitz (1967) and Stearns (1968).
This treatise is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the definitions of the solution con-
cepts and of some game properties. In contrast, Section 3 provides the concepts of the indirect
function and presents a dual pre-kernel characterization in terms of solution sets. A historical
gloss is presented in Section 4 to classify the results within a historical context. The reader who
is pressed for time may skip this section and postpone its reading. Nevertheless, we recommend
to be systematic in order not to lose the background of the subject. Section 5 introduces the first
network setting while focusing on the marriage ties of the leading Florentine families to conduct
a power analysis. We take account of a symmetric as well as an asymmetric setting to control
a number of votes within the network. Contrasted to the foregoing section, Section 6 changes
the setting while considering an à priori union between two leading families. The power analysis
is performed for a symmetric as well as an asymmetric weighting of nodes. The investigation
concludes in Section 7 with a study of the business ties among the families by discussion sym-
metric and asymmetric weighting configurations. We terminate this tract by some final remarks
in Section 8 and an Appendix in Section 9 provides the summary of the results in table form.
2 Preliminaries
A n-person cooperative game with side-payments is defined by an ordered pair 〈N, v〉. The set
N := {1, 2, . . . , n} represents the player set and v is the characteristic function with v : 2N → R,
and the convention that v(∅) := 0. Elements of N are denoted as players. A subset S of the
player set N is called a coalition. The real number v(S) ∈ R is called the value or worth of a
coalition S ∈ 2N . However, the cardinality of the player set N is given by n := |N |, and that for
a coalition S by s := |S|. We assume throughout that v(N) = 1 and n ≥ 2 is valid. Formally,
we identify a cooperative game by the vector v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ G
n = R2
|N|
, if no confusion can
arise, whereas in case of ambiguity, we identify a game by 〈N, v〉.
A TU game 〈N, v〉 is called to be simple whenever it satisfies
• v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊂ N and v(N) = 1.
• v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N .
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Notice, that a coalition S is called winning if v(S) = 1, otherwise losing. The set of all winning
coalitions is denoted as W . In this respect, we call a player k as critical, whenever the winning
coalition S ⊆ N s.t. k ∈ S will be turned into a losing coalition whenever player k is removed from
the coalition, i.e., if v(S) = 1 then v(S\{k}) = 0. Obviously, all sub-coalitions T ⊆ S\{k} are
losing. A swing of player k is a pair of coalitions of the form (S, S\{k}) such that k ∈ S ∈ W and
S\{k} /∈ W is satisfied. We denote the set of all swings for player k ∈ N by Ωk(N, v). Moreover,
a coalition is minimal winning if S is winning and no proper sub-coalition T of S is winning,
whereas the set of all minimal winning coalitions is defined by Mw(N, v) := {S ⊆ N | v(S) =
1 and v(T ) = 0 for T ⊂ S}. We realize that a minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition
where all players are critical. In the literature, simple games are also called voting games. In
this respect, a particular set of players is of importance, the so-called set of veto-players, which
is defined by Jv := {k ∈ N | v(N\{k}) = 0}. A member of Jv is a called a veto-player. Moreover,
a player k ∈ N is said to be a null-player, if for all S ⊆ N , it holds v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S).
A possible payoff allocation of the value v(S) for all S ⊆ N is described by the projection
of a feasible vector x ∈ Rn on its |S|-coordinates such that x(S) ≤ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , where
we identify the |S|-coordinates of the vector x with the corresponding measure on S, such that
x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk. The set of vectors x ∈ R
n which satisfies the efficiency principle v(N) = x(N)
is called the pre-imputation set and it is defined by
I ∗(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N)} , (2.1)
where an element x ∈ I ∗(v) is called a pre-imputation. The set of pre-imputations which
satisfies in addition the individual rationality property xk ≥ v({k}) for all k ∈ N is called
the imputation set I (N, v).
2.1 Power Indices
For introducing the Banzhaf-Coleman power index η(N, v) ∈ RN , let (N, v) be a simple game










for all k ∈ N . Hence, the Banzhaf-Coleman power index averages over all proper coalitions the
total counts of swing sets Ωk(N, v) for each player k ∈ N . This can be interpreted as indicating
the probability that a critical player k turns a losing coalition into a winning one independent of
the order of players. Dubey and Shapley (1979, p. 102) simply called this expression the swing
probability. In this sense, it is an à priori measure of power to influence a voting outcome to serve
one’s interests. Note in this respect that the Banzhaf index assigns the total power of a swing
coalition to the critical players, whereas the non-critical players are attributed with no power.
Hence, it is an à priori measure of power to bias a voting outcome in favor of a player k.
A first characterization of the Banzhaf index was provided by Dubey and Shapley (1979, p. 104)
through the null-player, anonymity, transfer and total power property. Alternatively, Feltkamp
(1995) characterized it by the null-player, anonymity, and additivity property, whereas additivity
can be replaced by strong monotonicity (cf. Peters (2008, p. 292)). However, it does not satisfies
the desirable efficiency property in accordance with the fact that not all permutations are con-
sidered rather than just the proper power set instead. In order to include this property in the
Banzhaf index, it must be normalized, which is given by
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for all k ∈ N . By the normalization it loses additivity, nevertheless it can be alternatively
characterized by null-player, anonymity, strong monotonicity, and 2-efficiency (cf. Peters (2008,
pp. 291-294)).
The other popular power index that contrast with the probability concept of Banzhaf while
intrinsically assuming that the n-players, who are in the process of making a vote, are aligned in
descent order of their enthusiasm w.r.t. the political proposal, i.e., the most passionate supporter
of the proposal coming first and the most rebellious opponent coming last, is called Shapley-Shubik
index. The unique player, who is turning a coalition to winning strength by joining, is called the
pivotal player of the ordering. This is the player that must be convinced to incline in favor or
disfavor of the proposal. If it is assumed that all permutations of players are equiprobable, then
the attribution of power to a specific player is the probability that she/he is pivotal, since each
permutation produces exactly one pivot. (cf. Dubey and Shapley (1979, p. 103)).
Definition 2.1 (Shapley and Shubik (1954)). Let (N, v) be a simple game. The Shapley-Shubik
power index assigns each (N, v) with its Shapley value. The k-th coordinate of the vector is
denoted as the Shapley-Shubik power index of player k, and it is given by
φSSIk (N, v) :=
∑
S∈Ωk(N,v)
(s − 1)! (n − s)!
n!
.
Hence, the Shapley-Shubik power index averages over all permutation of players the total
counts of swing sets Ωk(N, v) for each player k ∈ N . This number is the probability that a pivotal
player k turns a losing coalition into a winning one depending on the order of players.
Let us now discuss a special subclass of simple games, where a council of n members has to
pass a bill. To capture a wide range of possible voting games, one is not restricted to the general
election rule one man one vote. The number of votes needs not to be tied to the number of
players, like for a stockholders’ meeting. Hence, to be as general as possible we assume wi ∈ R+.
Moreover, the total number of votes are specified by w(N) ∈ R++. For passing the bill at least
q votes are needed s.t. 0 < q ≤ w(N) holds. A simple game 〈 N, v 〉 is referred to a weighted
majority game, if there exists a quota (threshold or quorum) q > 0 and weights wk ≥ 0 for all
k ∈ N such that for all S ⊆ N it holds either v(S) = 1 if w(S) ≥ q or v(S) = 0 otherwise. Then
the simple game 〈 N, v 〉 is representable by real measures [q; w1, . . . , wn], which satisfies v = v
q
w.
We rewrite these measures as a pair (q, w) ∈ (R × Rn) to denote a representation of the simple
game 〈 N, v 〉. The representation (q, w) of 〈 N, v 〉 is a homogeneous representation of 〈 N, v 〉
whenever the subsequent condition is valid
S ∈ Mw(N, v) =⇒ w(S) = q. (2.4)
Note that if a weighted majority game has a homogeneous representation, then it is homogeneous
(cf. Peleg and Sudhölter (2007)). The term homogeneous game was introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) to study the main simple solution (the so-called v.N.-M.-solution).
In the economic literature – i.e., by the articles of Barry (1980a,b); Holler (1982); Holler and
Packel (1983) – the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Coleman or the Deegan-Packel power index were
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criticized on the ground that they consider a coalition value as a private good, i.e., the allocated
spoil of a winning coalition is rivalrous and excludable in consumption, which is due that it equally
distributes the value among the members of a winning coalition (Deegan-Packel index, see Deegan
and Packel (1978)) or to assign it to the pivotal/critical player (Shapley-Shubik/Banzhaf-Coleman
index). Note that a player is considered as critical whenever her/his removal from a winning
coalition turns the coalition into a losing coalition. In this context to incorporate even the public
good aspect, i.e., no exclusion and no deterrence of consumption, an alternative power index
was proposed to only focus on the minimal winning coalitions instead, since they form decisive
groups that determine the outcome (cf. Holler and Packel (1983, pp. 23-24)). All members of
such a coalition are attributed to the same extent with the spoil, no one can be excluded from
the benefit. This gives the interpretation of a public good consumption. Under this perception it
was assumed that each coalition has equal probability to form with the consequence that different
minimal winning coalitions bring forward different public goods as a possible collective outcome
(cf. Holler (2018, pp. 33-34)). This alternative power index that is based on the idea to use the
minimal winning coalitions to express the voting power of each individual player was proposed
by Holler (1982); Holler and Packel (1983) – and was also denoted as a public good index (PGI).
Sometimes this voting power index is denoted in the literature as the Holler or Holler-Packel
index, we follow this convention in the sequel for the simple reason that we do not consider this
index as a public good index. However, before we shall make our point why it is not adequate
to consider this index as a public good index, we want to introduce its definition before we are
going to discuss some major deficiencies. To this end, the power for each player k ∈ N w.r.t. the






or pk(N, v) := 0, i.e., if there does not exist any S ∈ Mw(N, v) with k ∈ S. This formula is simply
a count of the minimal winning coalitions to which player k belongs, which is a non-negative
integer, called the public value. All members of a minimal winning coalition S are profiting to the
same extent from the attribution of power, no one is excluded, likewise such as the consumption
of a public good. To get a normalization, one sums up the counts across all players to use it as
a normalizer (divisor) of this count. Then we define for each player k ∈ N the Holler power
index by





Involving voting weights, a power distribution w.r.t. a solution concept satisfies local mono-
tonicity, whenever it holds wi ≥ wj , then xi ≥ xj is given for all player pairs (i, j) ∈ (N × N) s.t.
i 6= j. That is to say, whenever player i controls a larger share of votes than player j, player i
must be more powerful than player j. To see that the Holler index does not satisfy local mono-
tonicity in general, we provide the following vote distribution [35, 20, 15, 15, 15] with the quorum
of q2 = 51 to construct a counter-example. Then the Holler index provides the power distribution
(4, 2, 3, 3, 3)/15 that violates local monotonicity for player 2 (cf. Holler and Packel (1983)).
In order to avoid that the Holler index is violating local monotonicity, all winning coalitions
must be considered, which are induced by the set of minimal winning coalitions. Modifying the
Holler index in this respect, we first define for each player k ∈ N either
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or pmk (N, v) := 0, i.e., if there does not exist any T ∈ Mw(N, v) with k ∈ T . The former case
is simply a count of the winning coalitions whenever player k belongs to at least one minimal
winning coalition, in the latter case the count is set to zero. This assures that the null-player
property is satisfied. All members of a winning coalition S are profiting to the same extent from
the attribution of power, no one is excluded. To get a normalization, one sums up the counts
across all players to use it as a normalizer of this count. Then we define for each player k ∈ N
the modified Holler power index by







Having modified the Holler index, local monotonicity is fulfilled by (12, 9, 8, 8, 8)/45. Similar,
the Banzhaf-Coleman as well as the Shapley-Shubik power index satisfying local monotonicity
(cf. Felsenthal (2016)).
To close the discussion w.r.t. the Holler index, we now want to explain why we do not consider
those as a public good index. This is caused that we interpret a transferable utility game as
a stylized bargaining or voting procedure where subjects are trying to find an outcome on the
basis of an agreed upon set of principles of distributive arbitration or voting rules (axioms). The
resultant outcome can then be classified as fair, since it is referring to a solid foundation of upright
standards that even apply in voting situations with unequal partners. For a weighted majority
game this share means the largest possible power to bias an approving policy into her/his favor
that respects their choice of rules of distributive justice (fairness). A choice that can be made,
for instance, on a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.
In the line of the Holler index, subjects have agreed upon on a set of fairness rules that
comprises the null-player, anonymity, efficiency and the mergeability principle to impose their
power on a policy (cf. Holler and Packel (1983, pp. 116-117)). Likewise, subjects, who prefer the
Deegan-Packel power index over any other power index, have a different view of fairness, and base
their rule of distributive justice on null-player, symmetry, efficiency, and minimal monotonicity
(cf. Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, p. 438)). Whereas subjects, who made under a Rawlsian type of
decision a choice on the principles of null-player, symmetry, efficiency and critical mergeability
will apply the Johnston power index (cf. Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2007, p. 439)) to reflect their norms
of fairness.
In contrast to Holler (2018, pp. 33-34), our point of view does not allow that each minimal
winning coalition bring forward a different public good or collective outcome with equal proba-
bility, for instance. Apparently, à priori, each coalition can be assumed to be equiprobable, and
from that perspective some authors uses this term as a prefix in connection with coalition, and
therefore with the power index to stress the point that the voting is still not concluded (cf. Deegan
and Packel (1978); Felsenthal (2016)). Obviously, for an à priori power index it does not matter,
which coalition manifests à posteriori. A membership within a coalition simply allows a subject to
protect or defend her/his interests in the run-up of the weighted majority voting in the line of the
once agreed upon fairness perception. In the same vein, we do not follow the consideration that
the assignment of spoil to a pivotal/critical player (Shapley-Shubik/Banzhaf-Coleman index) or
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of an equal share among members – “sharing a cake” – (Deegan-Packel index) indicates a private
good consumption. In the former case (public good case by Holler) the total power is attributed
to all members of the minimal winning coalition instead, and in the latter case (private good case
by the same author), the power is either attributed to the critical players or it is attributed equally
among the subjects, since they are considered as equally strong partners. No consumption of a
good, let it be public or private, has materialized at this prior stage. Just different attributions
of power has been assigned to an à priori winning or minimal winning coalition to finally measure
the potential power of a subject to bias the final outcome that has not occurred yet.
To enforce their interests onto an approving policy, subjects have an interest to be a member
on as much priori winning coalitions as possible, and in this respect the formation of a winning
coalition, which is is not minimal, is not caused “by luck” in our opinion, in contrast to that what
was expressed by Holler (2018, pp. 34). This is firstly due that in the run-up of a vote no formation
of an à priori coalitions can be materialized, and secondly, to judge if a formation of a coalition
was caused by lucky circumstances can only be scrutinized à posteriori. However, and that is
the crucial point, this argument should give a justification why only minimal winning coalitions
ought to be considered. Which we can not follow, since we are convinced that no feasible winning
coalition should be excluded à priori from such a voting model, otherwise one has amputated a
subject from an opportunity to push forward her/his interests. And in this context of a prior
voting process, a subject will point to all à priori winning coalitions that support her/his claim to
power. All partners can immediately verify this claim to power in accordance with the principle
of full rationality and complete information. No uncertainty is involved. It should be obvious by
this argumentation that at this stage no vote has been carried out. We are still in the middle
of a weighted majority voting. And to estimate the power of the individual subject for that
vote, all à priori winning coalitions ought be included. Hence, for the reason to correctly reflect
the expected individual power, we took them into account for the modified Holler index. This
argument must even hold for à priori minimal winning coalitions when one consider them as an
appropriate measure to estimate power. By this consideration we do not incline in favor for an
interpretation of a public good index rather than on an à priori measure of power to influence a
still approving policy.1
This might be a reason why this power index does not become as popular as the Shapley-
Shubik or Banzhaf index. Nevertheless, the Holler index as well as the other mentioned power
indices are providing for the measurement of power a different perception of fairness through
their axiomatic foundation. Rather to consider fairness as an opaque concept that is based on
subjective feelings of an individual, it is now possible to base the perception of fairness on objective
norms. In the line of these norms, an objective à priori measure of power is obtained. Different
rules of norms imply different measures of power. Reflecting the fact that there exists no uniform
understanding of power among the people. This make them attractive from our point of view.
If there is consensus that the objective norms of distributive justice (axioms) of the Holler index
reflecting best the fairness preferences of the subjects involved in a voting process, then there is
also consensus that only minimal winning coalitions should count to measure the à priori power
of subjects. Though they must also accept its defects, like the violation of local monotonicity, for
instance. Hence, each of these indices provide a different measure of power on the basis of their
objective norms of fairness.
Finally, let us turn our attention to the two still missing power indices, which we have al-
1Based on private conversation with M. J. Holler.
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ready mentioned, but which have not been formally introduced. To start with, we introduce the
Deegan-Packel power index through









for all k ∈ N . Similar to the Holler index, we realize by its formula that only minimal winning
coalitions ought to be considered by the assignment of power to an individual player. Each of
these coalition is assumed to be equally likely. The spoil of a minimal winning coalition is equally
distributed among its members, whereas non-members are attributed with a zero payoff. The
real number assigned by this formula to player k is the expected attribution of power in turning
a losing coalition into a minimal winning coalition.
Next, specify the set of critical players of coalitions by N(S) := {k ∈ S | S ∈ W ∧S\{k} /∈ W }.
Thus, it holds N(S) = S whenever all players in S are critical. And the collection of all coalitions
which contains at least one critical player Gw(N, v) is specified through
Gw(N, v) :=
{
S ∈ W | ∃i ∈ S s.t. S\{i} /∈ W
}
,
then the Johnston power index is defined by









for all k ∈ N . The formula looks similar to the Deegan-Packel index. However, in contrast to
those, it takes the total number of critical players within a coalition into account and attributes the
resultant spoil equally among the critical players within this coalition. These payoff assignment
are added up for each player over all coalition to which she/he is critical, and this sum is divided
by the overall number of swings. The real number assigned by this formula to player k is the
expected attribution of power in turning an emerging coalition into a victorious.
2.2 The Kernel and Pre-Kernel
Finally, we want to contrast the power indices with the pre-nucleolus and pre-kernel. Given a
vector x ∈ I ∗(v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x in
the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S, x) := v(S) − x(S). (2.11)
A non-negative (non-positive) excess of S at x in the game 〈N, v〉 represents a gain (loss) to the
members of the coalition S unless the members of S do not accept the payoff distribution x by
forming their own coalition which guarantees v(S) instead of x(S).
Take a game v ∈ G n. For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player
i over player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ I ∗(v) is given by the maximum excess at
x over the set of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S, x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.12)
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The expression sij(x, v) describes the maximum amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can
gain without the cooperation of player j. The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I ∗(v) that balances
the maximum surpluses for each distinct pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel
of the game v, and is defined by
PK (N, v) := {x ∈ I ∗(N, v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} . (2.13)
The pre-kernel has the advantage of addressing a stylized bargaining process, in which the figure
of argumentation is a pairwise equilibrium procedure of claims while relying on his best
arguments, that is, the coalitions that will best support his claim. The pre-kernel solution char-
acterizes all those imputations in which all pairs of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j are in equilibrium with
respect to their claims.
Observe that in case that the admissible bargaining range is the imputation set I (N, v) rather
than I ∗(N, v), player j cannot get less than v({j}), the amount he can assure by himself without
relying on the cooperation of the other players. A player i outweighs player j w.r.t. the proposal
x ∈ I (N, v) presented in a bilateral bargaining situation if xj > v({j}) and sij(x, v) > sji(x, v).
The set of imputations I (N, v) for which no player outweighs another player is called the kernelof
a game v ∈ G n referred to as K (N, v). More formally, the kernel of a n-person game is the set
of imputations x ∈ I (N, v) satisfying for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
[sij(x, v) − sji(x, v)] · [xj − v({j})] ≤ 0 and (2.14)
[sji(x, v) − sij(x, v)] · [xi − v({i})] ≤ 0. (2.15)
This solution scheme is related to the pre-kernel PK (N, v) of a TU game. In addition, the fol-
lowing inclusion PK (N, v)∩I (N, v) ⊂ K (N, v) is satisfied. The kernel is non-empty whenever
the imputation set in non-empty, and it is a finite union of closed convex polyhedra (cf. Davis and
Maschler (1965)). Therefore, we can infer that the pre-kernel is non-empty and it coincides with
the kernel for the class of zero-monotonic TU games (cf. Maschler et al. (1972)). Moreover, due
to Sudhölter (1996) it is known that the pre-kernel of every homogeneous weighted majority game
without winning players – i.e., a player who satisfies v({i}) = 1 or to put it differently wi ≥ q –
and without veto-players is star-shaped. In this context, it was established by Peleg et al. (1994)
that a weighted majority game without winning players but with a homogeneous representation
has a single-valued pre-kernel set, whenever it has veto-players. Notice that in connection with
the null-player, these types form a decomposition of the player set N in equivalence classes.
2.3 The Nucleolus and Pre-Nucleolus
The kernel as well as the pre-kernel solution are a set-valued solution scheme with the consequence
that it is difficult to justify why a selected element from one of these sets should be preferred over
the other. To overcome this selection problem, the nucleolus of a n-person game, denoted as
ν(v), might be the solution concept of choice, since it is contained in the kernel, ν(v) ∈ K (N, v),
it is non-empty and single-valued. This solution concept is due to Schmeidler (1969).
In order to define the nucleolus ν(N, v) of a game v ∈ G n, take any x ∈ I (N, v) to define a
2n − 1-tuple vector θ(x, v) whose components are the excesses ev(S, x) of the 2n − 1 non-empty
coalitions ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing order, that is,
θi(x, v) := e
v(Si, x) ≥ e
v(Sj , x) =: θj(x, v) if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 2
n − 1. (2.16)
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Ordering the so-called complaint or dissatisfaction vectors θ(x, v) for all x ∈ I (N, v) by the
lexicographic order ≤L on R
2n−1, we shall write
θ(x, v) <L θ(z, v) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 2
n − 1, (2.17)
such that θi(x, v) = θi(z, v) for 1 ≤ i < k and θk(x, v) < θk(z, v). Furthermore, we write
θ(x, v) ≤L θ(z, v) if either θ(x, v) <L θ(z, v) or θ(x, v) = θ(z, v). Notice that we omit the game
in the term θ whenever the game context is clear. Now, the nucleolus N (N, v) of a game v ∈ G n
over the set I (N, v) is defined as
N (N, v) = {x ∈ I (N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(z) ∀ z ∈ I (N, v)} . (2.18)
At this set the total complaint θ(x) is lexicographically minimized over the non-empty compact
convex imputation set I (N, v). Schmeidler (1969) proved that the nucleolus N (N, v) is non-
empty whenever I (N, v) is non-empty and it consists of a unique point, which is referred to as
ν(N, v).
Notice that in this context a game has a nucleolus whenever the game is essential, that is, a





this class of games is denoted by E G n, otherwise, it is inessential. Hence, for an inessential game
the imputation set is empty, and the nucleolus does not exist. Moreover, we call a TU game
strictly essential whenever the inequality of Formula (2.19) holds strictly. This class of games
is denoted as S E G n.
Similar, the pre-nucleolus PN (N, v) over the pre-imputations set I ∗(N, v) is defined by
PN (N, v) = {x ∈ I ∗(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(z) ∀ z ∈ I
∗(N, v)} . (2.20)
The pre-nucleolus of any game v ∈ G n is non-empty as well as unique, and it is referred to as
ν∗(N, v). We summarize this discussion by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Single-Valuedness of the (Pre-)Nucleolus). Set either X := I ∗(N, v) or X :=
I (N, v), which are both non-empty, compact and convex sets, then the (pre-)nucleolus consists of
a single point for all 〈 N, v 〉 ∈ G w.r.t. X.
Imposing on the worth of any proper coalition – namely the set of coalitions excluding the
grand coalition N and the empty set – the same cost ǫ ∈ R, then we can define the strong ǫ-core
Cǫ(N, v) through
Cǫ(N, v) := {x ∈ I (N, v) | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) − ǫ ∀ ∅ 6= S ⊂ N} . (2.21)
with C 0(N, v) = C (N, v). It should be evident that the strong ǫ-core generalizes the core concept.
For n ≥ 2 we note that Cǫ(N, v) 6= ∅ if ǫ is large enough and Cǫ(N, v) = ∅ for small enough
ǫ. Furthermore, if ǫ1 < ǫ2 then Cǫ1(N, v) ⊆ Cǫ2(N, v) and Cǫ1(N, v) ⊂ Cǫ2(N, v) whenever
Cǫ2(N, v) 6= ∅. Taking the intersection of all non-empty strong ǫ-cores determines a set of latent
allocations, namely the least core. The location of these latent allocations can be identified by
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Note that the value ǫ0(v) specifies the smallest ǫ for which the strong ǫ-core still exists. This
critical value can be even negative. It is positive, whenever the core is empty, i.e., C 0(N, v) = ∅.
This core concept was introduced into the literature Maschler et al. (1979)) to investigate the
geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus and related solutions. This is due to that we have
ν(v) ∈ Cǫ(N, v), whenever Cǫ(N, v) 6= ∅ and ǫ ≤ 0.
3 A Dual Pre-Kernel Representation
Theorem 3.1 (Martinez-Legaz (1996)). The indirect function π : Rn → R of any n-person TU
game is a non-increasing polyhedral convex function such that
(i) ∂π(x) ∩ {−1, 0}n 6= ∅ ∀x ∈ Rn,
(ii) {−1, 0}n ⊂
⋃
x∈Rn ∂π(x), and
(iii) minx∈Rn π(x) = 0.
Conversely, if π : Rn → R satisfies (i)-(iii) then there exists an unique n-person TU game 〈N, v〉









∀ S ⊆ N. (3.1)









∀x ∈ Rn, (3.2)
whereas ∂π is the subdifferential of the function π. Hence, ∂π(x) is the set of all subgradients of
π at x, which is a closed polyhedral convex set. A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of
the indirect function is due to Meseguer-Artola (1997). Here, we present this representation in
its most general form, although we restrict ourselves to the trivial coalition structure B = {N}.
The pre-imputation that comprises the possibility of compensation between a pair of players
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, is denoted as x i,j,δ = (x i,j,δk )k∈N ∈ I
0(v), with δ ≥ 0, which is given by
x
i,j,δ
N\{i,j} = xN\{ i,j}, x
i,j,δ
i = xi − δ and x
i,j,δ
j = xj + δ
Proposition 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997)). For a TU game with indirect function π, a pre-
imputation x ∈ I ∗(v) is in the pre-kernel of 〈N, v〉 for the coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bl},
x ∈ PrK (v, B), if, and only if, for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, every i, j ∈ Bk, i < j, and some
δ ≥ δ1(v, x), one gets
π(x i,j,δ) = π(x j,i,δ).
whereas δ1(x, v) := maxk∈N,S⊂N\{k} |v(S ∪ {k}) − v(S) − xk|.
Meseguer-Artola (1997) was the first who recognized that based on the result of Proposition 3.1
a pre-kernel element can be derived as a solution of an over-determined system of non-linear equa-
tions. Every over-determined system can be equivalently expressed as a minimization problem.
The set of global minima coalesces with the pre-kernel set. For the trivial coalition structure
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where, for some δ ≥ δ1(x, v),
fij(x) := π(x












2 ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ Rn. (3.4)
For further details see Meinhardt (2013b, Chap. 5 & 6). Then one can establish the subsequent
result:










h(y) = 0, (3.5)
if, and only if, x ∈ PrK (v).
To identify a partition of the domain of function h into payoff equivalence classes we first
define the set of most effective or significant coalitions for each pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j











When we gather for all pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j all these coalitions that support the claim
of a specific player over some other players, we have to consider the concept of the collection of







Notice that the set Cij(x) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j does not have cardinality one, which is required to
identify a partition on the domain of function h. Now let us choose for each pair i, j ∈ N, i 6= j a
descending ordering on the set of most effective coalitions in accordance with their size, and within
such a collection of most effective coalitions having smallest size the lexicographical minimum is
singled out, then we obtain the required uniqueness to partition the domain of h. This set is
denoted by Sij(x) for all pairs i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and gathering all these collections we are able to







i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
. (3.8)
This set will be denoted in short as the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions. Given the
correspondence S on the payoff space we say that two payoff vectors x and y are equivalent w.r.t.
the binary relation ∼ iff S (x) = S (y). In case that the binary relation ∼ is reflexive, symmetric
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and transitive, then it is an equivalence relation and it induces equivalence classes [~γ] on
dom h which we define through [~γ] := {x ∈ dom h |x ∼ ~γ}. Thus, if x ∼ ~γ, then [x] = [~γ],
and if x ≁ ~γ, then [x] ∩ [~γ] = ∅. This implies that whenever the binary relation ∼ induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on dom h, then it partitions the domain dom h of the function h. The
resulting collection of equivalence classes [~γ] on dom h is called the quotient of dom h modulo ∼,
and we denote this collection by dom h/ ∼. We indicate this set as an equivalence class whenever
the context is clear, otherwise we apply the term payoff set or payoff equivalence class.
Proposition 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013b)). The binary relation ∼ on the set dom h defined by x ∼
~γ ⇐⇒ S (x) = S (~γ) is an equivalence relation, which forms a partition of the set dom h by the
collection of equivalence classes {[~γk]}k∈J , where J is an arbitrary index set. Furthermore, for all
k ∈ J , the induced equivalence class [~γk] is a convex set .
This binary relation induces a partition on the payoff space. Having identified payoff equiv-
alence classes, we can select an arbitrary payoff vector to get a unique quadratic and convex
function. To see this, select payoff vector x from payoff equivalence class [~γ], then we get the
set S (x) from which a rectangular matrix E can be constructed through Eij := (1Sji − 1Sij ) ∈
R
n, ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, and E0 := −1N ∈ R
n. Notice that in this respect the characteristic vector





these q-column vectors, we can construct matrix E as an (n × q)-matrix in Rn×q, which is given
by
E := [E1,2, . . . , En−1,n, E0] ∈ R
n×q
. (3.9)
A matrix Q ∈ Rn
2
can now be expressed as Q = 2 · E E⊤, a column vector a as 2 · E ~α ∈ Rn.
Moreover, defining αij := v(Sij) − v(Sji) ∈ R ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j and α0 := v(N). Finally, the scalar
α is given by ‖~α‖2, whereas E ∈ Rn×q, E⊤ ∈ Rq×n and ~α ∈ Rq. For the details to construct the
above set, matrix and vector we refer the reader to Meinhardt (2013b, Chap. 5 & 6).
From vector ~γ the set (3.8) is constructed and then matrix Q, column vector a, and scalar α
are induced from which a quadratic and convex function can be specified through
h~γ(x) = (1/2) · 〈 x, Q x 〉 + 〈 x, a 〉 + α x ∈ R
n. (3.10)
In view of Proposition 6.2.2 Meinhardt (2013b) function h as defined by (3.4) is composed of a
finite family of quadratic and convex functions of type (3.10). For the details, we again refer
the interested reader to Meinhardt (2013b, Chap. 5 & 6). In accordance with Theorem 7.3.1
by Meinhardt (2013b, p. 137) a dual representation of the pre-kernel is obtained as a finite union





M(h~γk , [~γk]). (3.11)
where J ′ is a finite index set such that J ′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. In addition, g(~γk) is the
minimum value of a minimization problem under constraints of function h~γk over the closed convex
payoff set [~γk]. For the index set it is claimed that this minimum value is equal to zero on the
closed payoff set [~γk]. The solution sets M(h~γk , [~γk]) are convex. Taking the finite union of convex
sets may give us a non-convex set. Hence, the pre-kernel set is generically a non-convex set for
games with more than 4 players. By the characterization of (3.11) we observe that it can be even
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disconnected. Some examples of a disconnected pre-kernel were discussed by Kopelowitz (1967)
and Stearns (1968). An example form this source was recently reconsidered in Meinhardt (2013b,
Sec. 8.5). According to our information, this is the sole example of a disconnected pre-kernel
investigated in the literature. However, we have found some further evidence that a disconnected
pre-kernel occurs more frequently as this example may suggest. This evidence is supported by
the findings of Subsection 5.2 and 6.2. Thus, it might be a rare event having a null measure, but
it can be materialized even though the conditions under which such an event can be observed are
still unclear. Caused by the fact that the pre-kernel is still not fully understood.
For the class of convex games and three person games we have | J ′ | = 1, which implies
that the pre-kernel must be a singleton. In this respect, Meinhardt (2020b) has established that
whenever a default game has a unique pre-kernel satisfying the non-empty interior condition for
a payoff set, then on a restricted subset of the game space constituted by the default game and
a set of related games this point is the sole pre-kernel element. The pre-kernel correspondence is
single-valued and constant on this subset.











= ~γ◦ ∈ M(h~γ) ∀~γ ∈ R
n, (3.12)
where Qγ and aγ are the matrix and the column vector induced by vector ~γ, respectively. Notice
that matrix Q†~γ is the pseudo-inverse of matrix Qγ . In addition, the set M(h~γ) is the solution
set of function h~γ . Under a regime of orthogonal projection this mapping induces a cycle free
method to evaluate a pre-kernel point for any class of TU games. We restate here Algorithm 8.1.1
of Meinhardt (2013b) in a more succinctly written form by
Algorithm 3.1: Procedure to seek for a Pre-Kernel Element
Data: Arbitrary TU Game 〈N, v 〉, and a payoff vector ~γ0 ∈ R
n.
Result: A payoff vector s.t. ~γk+1 ∈PrK (v).
begin
0 k ←− 0, S (~γ−1)←− ∅
1 Select an arbitrary starting point ~γ0
if ~γ0 /∈PrK (v) then Continue
else Stop
2 Determine S (~γ0)
if S (~γ0) 6= S (~γ−1) then Continue
else Stop
repeat
3 if S (~γk) 6= ∅ then Continue
else Stop
4 Compute Ek and ~αk from S (~γk) and v
5 Determine Qk and ak from Ek and ~αk
6 Calculate by Formula (3.12) x
7 k ←− k + 1
8 ~γk+1 ←− x
9 Determine S (~γk+1)
until S (~γk+1) = S (~γk)
end
Meinhardt (2013b, Theorem 8.1.2) establishes that this iterative procedure converges towards




− 1-iteration steps are sufficient to successfully terminate the search process. However, we
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have some empirical evidence that generically at most n+1-iteration steps are needed to determine
an element from the pre-kernel set (cf. Meinhardt (2013b, Appendix A)).2
4 A historical Gloss
The House of Medici was a Italian dynasty originated from the Mugello region of Tuscany. Its
founder was Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici (1360-1429), who was not from the middle class as
commonly believed, the preserved tax records show that during this time period the Medici
were by far the richest family in Florence. Giovanni di Bicci also founded in 1397 the bank of
the same name, which operated on an international level with branches across Europe till 1494.
The rise of the Medici Bank was the result of the collapse of the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuolli
companies caused by excessive loans to Edward III, King of England, with the consequence that
the disappearance of these companies deprived the Pope from the facilities to finance the Vatican
spending. This place was taken by the Medici Bank, and made it in the 15th-century to one
of the largest financial institution in Europe providing the necessary economical resources that
allow the House of Medici to seize the political power in Florence (cf. de Roover (1966, pp. 1-5)).
Their political influence was strong enough to bring forth four Popes of the Catholic Church and
two queens of the Kingdom of France. One of the most prominent political actor of this dynasty
was Cosimo de’ Medici, called the Elder, and son of Giovanni di Bicci. Even though Padgett and
Ansell (1993, p. 1264) stressed the point that “Cosimo did not set out a grand design to take
over the state”, he was, nevertheless, able to build up a network of supporters around him during
the Milan and Lucca wars (1424-33). This network builds up the necessary political capacity to
overcome even the disastrous war against the Republic of Lucca in 1433, for which he was made
responsible by the faction of the Albizzi and Strozzi families. He was put in jail, however he
managed to be exiled to Venice with his brother Lorenzo though the faction of his opponents
demanded his execution. Twelve months later the Medici network, operating from exile, imposed
a democratic vote to overturn Cosimo’s and Lorenzo’s banishment. An overturn that had its
origin in a failed seize of the city hall and the government by the Albizzi clan in September
1433 as the Medici could only operated from exile. Nevertheless, their network of supporters was
strong enough to prevent this subversion. Returned back to Florence, the Medici clan and their
supporters taking revenge to permanently banish or punish their enemies, in particular the Albizzi
and Guadagni family (cf. Padgett and Ansell (1993)). This was the origin of the prominence of
the House of Medici and the decline of the old Florentine oligarchs. Resulting finally into the end
of the Florentine Republic by 1569 and made the Medici hereditary rulers of the grand duchy of
Florence till their extinction in 1737 and with the accession of Francis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine
and husband of Maria Theresa of Austria.
The Strozzi, Albizzi, Peruzzi and the Guadagni families were members of the old oligarchs that
ruled the Republic of Florence before the rise of the House of Medici begun. In particular, the
Strozzi and Albizzi clans were the great rivals of the Medici. Like the Medici, the House of Strozzi
acquired their wealth from banking, had similar political ambitions, and was – in accordance with
the 1427 catasto3 – the most wealthy family of the Florentine elite, albeit their company was
overshadowed by the Medici Bank (cf. de Roover (1966, p. 3)). They were unfaltering opponents
2Algorithm 3.1 is implemented in our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2020a. The documentation of the toolbox
is given by Meinhardt (2013a) and ships with the toolbox.
3A register to record the financial assets and real estates of taxpayers to estimate their tax liabilities.
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of the Medici hegemony, and played a more crucial role during the 1527 insurrection. In contrast,
the House of Albizzi was the leading family and the actual ruler in Florence in the reaction that
followed the Ciompi Revolt4. Since that time the Albizzi were the enemies of the Medici caused
by Salvestro de’ Medici (1331–1388), a second cousin of Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici, who showed
sympathy with the insurrection of the Ciompi as he was Gonfaloniere di Giustizia5. Thereafter the
Medici were considered by the oligarchs as the party of the people, and they were regarded with
suspicion. Till the prominence of the House of Medici, the Albizzi pursued an aggressive foreign
policy to open a passage to sea for the wool and cloth trade while expanding the territories by force
and purchase. On the one hand it was the impetus of an increase in prosperity that manifests in
an immense jump in wealth of the republic (cf. Hibbert (1974, pp. 30-33)), but on the other hand
it was the cause of the disastrous issue of the war against Lucca initiate under the aegis of Rinaldo
degli Albizzi at 1429. Not to forget the House of Peruzzi, whose members were also bankers and
made their fortune with investments into the textile business. Their company was the second
largest of the Florentine banks operating across Europe and the Levant till the company failed
in 1343 due to unsecured loans to Edward III of England, who owed them “the value of a realm”
(cf. de Roover (1966, p. 3)). The Medici Bank never attained the size of the Peruzzi company
(cf. ibid. p. 3). Last but not least, the Guadagni clan, neighbors of the Albizzi with family links
to them, and bankers as the others, albeit they did not attain whose financial status (cf. Breiger
and Pattison (1986, Table 6)). Nevertheless, they produced Bernardo Guadagni (1367–1434), a
powerful adversary of Cosimo de’ Medici, who manged during his second term as Gonfaloniere di
Giustizia to imprison and to exile him to Venice.
The economic upswing of Florence attracted artisans, laborers, and craftsmen from surround-
ing regions to settle in this buzzing city. New arrivals who spread over the whole city, and who had
no former and embedded relations to the old ruling families. These new men sought ties to the
Florentine clientage system6 that were offered to them by the Medicean parvenus by an extraor-
dinarily centralized star network system with very few relations among the Medici supporters,
but with direct ties to the Medici clan itself. Moreover, these partisans were mainly connected
to the oligarchic elite through the Medici family (cf. Padgett and Ansell (1993, p.1278)). The
Medicean followed according to Padgett and Ansell (1993, p.1280) the simple maxim: to control
partisans politically, segregate their social relations with them and isolate them from all others.
This socially heterogeneous, but centralized mesh of relations allowed the Medici a direct control
over their network for a cohesive common action to hold down their rivals. In this context, Pad-
gett and Ansell (1993, pp. 1262-63) reported that Cosimo used the network defensively, acting
only “when need arose”, that is, he reacted on aggressive moves of his rivals but never made the
first move by himself while taking leadership due to his anxious, passive and indecisive character.
Contrasted to the Medici, the oligarchic network was skewed toward patricians and their
partisan loyalties that arose over a prolonged period of time through neighborhood residence at
the ward or quarter level. This elite was densely interconnected through marriage and insisted
on their status as equal among equals with the consequence that each family claimed leadership
(cf. Padgett and Ansell (1993, p.1279)). This socially homogeneous mesh of relations was inimical
4A rebellion for political participation in the Florentine government (1378-82) of non-organized laborers who did
not belong to any guild.
5Head of the government of the Republic of Florence.
6A clientage refers to a hierarchical relationship between a patron and clients with mutual obligations. The patron
or protector granted benefits to the client, in return the client owed allegiance, for instance, support to the patron
running for a political office. The origin of clientelism can be traced back to the ancient Rome.
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for a coherent, cohesive, and purposeful action. By these considerations, Padgett and Ansell (1993)
considered the Medicean network superior over the oligarchic and as the source of their political
prominence.
This short historical gloss of the principal actors in the Florentine Republic let us focus on
the ruling families as the subject of our analysis. The catasto of 1427 identified in total 10171
families from a population of about 50000 inhabitants, from which only 200 households were
paying more than 25 florins (fiorino d’oro) taxes, only three household were paying more than
100 florins, among those were the Medici (cf. de Roover (1966, pp. 28-31)). Padgett and Ansell
(1993) identified 215 Florentine leading families drawn from the catasto, but they focused in their
study on just 92 families. Breiger and Pattison (1986, p. 219) used an extended data base of 116
families from the same authors from which they picked out those 16 families from the 1427 catasto
(cf. ibid. Table 1 and Table 6) “whose support of, or opposition to, the Medicis has been clearly
established”. We resume this data set for our purpose (cf. Table 4.1 and 4.2). The data set is
wide-enough, but not too large to be able to conduct a power index analysis.7
Table 4.1: Florentine Marriage Relations
Familya
Family
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 16 12 13 14 15
01 ACCIAIUOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZI 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
03 BARBADORI 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
04 BISCHERI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
05 CASTELLAN 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
06 GINORI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
07 GUADAGNI 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
08 LAMBERTES 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
09 MEDICI 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
10 PAZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
11 PERUZZI 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
16 PUCCI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 RIDOLFI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
13 SALVIATI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 STROZZI 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
15 TORNABUON 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
a cf. Table 1 of Breiger and Pattison (1986, p. 218).
7MATLAB R2020b can only handle 40 different actors, whereas the double-precision floating-point format would
allow to consider up to 51 actors. Quadruple-precision floating-point format extends this bound up to 111.
However, a number that still falls short of the mentioned 215 Florentine families.
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Table 4.2: Florentine Business Relations
Familya
Family
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 16 12 13 14 15
01 ACCIAIUOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
03 BARBADORI 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
04 BISCHERI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
05 CASTELLAN 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
06 GINORI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
07 GUADAGNI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
08 LAMBERTES 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
09 MEDICI 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
10 PAZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 PERUZZI 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 PUCCI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 RIDOLFI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 SALVIATI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 STROZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 TORNABUON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a cf. Table 1 of Breiger and Pattison (1986, p. 218).
Our work was inspired by Holler and Rupp (2020) who investigated for the first time the
Florentine marriage and business relations from a view point of cooperative game theory. In
particular, their findings – that are based on the public good index – provided some further
evidence of an accentuated position of the Medici family, albeit not as outstanding as it was
already recognized for decades by sociologists such as Breiger and Pattison (1986); Padgett and
Ansell (1993); Padgett (2010) to mention just those studies that found even great attention across
disciplines. In our opinion, the attributed power could not significantly explain their rise to power,
which is our motivation to resume an extended analysis. Rather than to confine ourselves on the
public good index w.r.t. an underlying network structure, we include in our analysis even the
power indices from our previous discussion to investigate whether this outstanding position of the
House of Medici could be at least confirmed by an alternative measurement of power.
To qualify a solution concept as a standard of fairness, we consider as a desirable feature,
– apart of an appealing axiomatic foundation, its stability properties, or a comprehensible and
efficient computability – its capability of providing empirical evidence, i.e., its capability of repli-
cating a real outcome as close as possible. A solution that does not replicate known events, reveals
that real actors do not act in accordance with its principles of distributive arbitration. Hence,
the fairness rules that characterize the solution do not constitute any moral guideline for subjects
by their decision making. They may offer nice mathematical properties that are interesting and
worthwhile to study, but they lack the crucial ingredient of describing human behavior. We would
not go so-far to deny for it every value and classify such a solution as useless, but its significance
is rather limited.
5 Florentine Elite Marriages
Normally, one analyzes the power of individuals in a political decision-making process without
considering any relationships among each other. In such a framework one ignores the most
significant ingredient of political success, namely the formation, control and domination of a
network of relationships to influence a voting outcome and institutions to serve one’s interests.
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To incorporate the underlying mesh of relations into the measurement of power, we need to specify
the network, for instance, by an undirected graph in order to obtain a game representation in
characteristic function form. Exemplarily to conduct a power index analysis for an underlying
network structure, we are focusing on the ruling families of the Republic of Florence during the
late medieval and the early Renaissance.
During the mentioned time period not individuals but rather than families were the principal
actors. A family was comprised in general by people with the same last name, albeit it has
more the character of a clan than of a household. The medieval as well as the Renaissance were
not the era of individualism. Relations among households were typically organized by a clan
structure. The clan, led by a chieftain like Cosimo de’ Medici (1389-1464), decided everything






























Figure 1: Florentine Elite Marriages 1395-14348
In order to pursue a network power analysis of the leading Florentine families, we need to
define a weighted majority graph problem. For doing so, we have to remind that a weighted
majority TU game is referring to a weighted majority problem [q; w1, . . . , wn] s.t. v(S) = 1
whenever w(S) ≥ q or v(S) = 0 otherwise. In addition, to introduce a network game that allows
us to analyze the Florentine marriage and business relations by the power index method, we need
to modify the weighted graph approach introduced by Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) in some
8The used network data set of the Florentine Marriage Relations is provided by the file florentine_m that ships
with the R software package netrankr of Schoch (2020a) that is based on the work of Breiger and Pattison
(1986). Notice that the Pucci family is not part of network graph, since it has no marriage links with other
florentine families (cf. ibid. Table 1, p. 218).
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respect. Analogously, we set out an undirected graph by G := (V, E) that is constituted by a set of
vertices (nodes), denoted as V that is considered as the set of agents; and a set of edges specified
by E : V → V s.t. a pair (i, j) ∈ (V × V) constitutes the edge to specify the relationship between
a pair of agents. Moreover, to define a weighted majority graph problem, we need to introduce
a mapping w : V → R++ s.t. the number wi > 0 is the weight of the vertex – gravity of the
node –, i.e., the share of votes controlled by player i. We set w := (wi)i∈N . Contrasted to a
weighted graph problem, we do not allow self-loops. A weighted majority graph problem is now
specified by the triple wMP := (G, w, q). The corresponding network weighted majority TU game
can then be determined by setting N = V, i.e., each player corresponds to a vertex/agent, and
the characteristic value of a coalition S ⊆ N is determined by v(S) = 1, if S is a connected graph
of a weighted majority sub-graph problem wMPS s.t. w(S) ≥ q, otherwise v(S) = 0. We denote
the class of network weighted majority games by G S nwMP . By the construction of the associated
simple game from a weighted majority graph problem, we can then apply a power index analysis
based on the characteristic function form. To get the game, we have to transcribe Table 4.1 into
a graph, which is given by Figure 1
This graph depicts the marriage relations of the 16 families whose support of, or the opposition
to, the House of Medici could be identified through the work of Breiger and Pattison (1986). By
inspection of the figure, it is noticeable that only 15 families (nodes) are counted. This is due
that in accordance with Table 4.1 no marriage relations to the other 15 families can be identified
for the Pucci clan so that they are removed from the network. We referring to this undirected
graph as G1.
To derive from this network structure the associated voting game, we follow – for comparability
reasons – the assumptions made by Holler and Rupp (2020, p. 6) that to each player node the
same weight of one is assigned, and that just a simple majority rule is applied. Hence, the set of
agents has cardinality 15, for all k ∈ N , an agent k has a weight of wk = 1, and the quorum is
set to q = 8, so that the weighted majority graph problem based on Table 4.1 is given by




These information are enough to derive a voting game. For getting the game, graph G1 can be
characterized by an edge matrix through
mE =
[
1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 9 9 9 10 11 12 12
9 6 7 9 5 9 7 11 14 11 14 8 15 12 13 15 13 14 14 15
]
,
which has the form of of a generalized permutation. Having set out the edge matrix to represent
graph G1 as well as the parameter values of (w, q) the graph problem wMP1 is well defined and the
corresponding simple game can be created, for instance, while using MATLAB.9 Let us denote
this game as 〈N, v1〉.
Since our work was inspired by the work of Holler and Rupp (2020), we start the power
analysis with the Holler index – or public good index – for the above graph problem. Applying
9A computation method is implemented in our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2020a as well as a set of routines
to compute the discussed results. This set of methods can be made available upon request.
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Formula (2.6) and its power index distributions is given by
φ HI(N, v1) = (0.0520, 0.0879, 0.0721, 0.0735, 0.0647, 0.0374, 0.0914, 0.0389, 0.1179,
0.0271, 0.0561, 0.0727, 0.0697, 0.0730, 0.0656),
and the array of the associated public values is quantified through
p(N, v1) = (343, 580, 476, 485, 427, 247, 603, 257, 778, 179, 370, 480, 460, 482, 433).
The above distribution confirms the results of Holler and Rupp (2020, p. 10), listed by their Table
1. The Medici clan, on coordinate 9, has an accentuated position, followed by their rivals the
Guadagni (7) and the Albizzi (2). However, to identify if an actor has an outstanding position, an
informal look at the highest value is not sufficient. Rather, we fix such a statement in terms of the
squared expected deviation from the mean (variance). The smaller this measure, the closer is the
dispersion of the set of power with the consequence that the largest value cannot be designated
as outstanding. Contrasted with, an outstanding position is classified to a wide spread from the
mean, a large variance. The variance 5.2618 of the power distribution10 shown by Table 9.11 is
too small to identify an actor as outstanding. From this power distribution, we cannot infer on
an outstanding position of the Medici network. Rather we would say that the power, expressed
by the Holler index, was insufficient to explain their rise to power in Florentine politics. It can
also not explain why the Medici network was strong enough to prevent the seize of the city hall
and the government by the old oligarchs in September 1433. It is hardly to imagine that this
subversion could ever be foiled by the Medicean on the basis of the above power distribution.
Furthermore, the power of the Strozzi clan (14), the most wealthy family and great rival of the
Medicean, seems to be underestimated, they are ranked on place 5. Contrasted to that, we do
not consider the power of the Guadagni, Albizzi and the Strozzi networks as influential enough to
prevent them from seizing the power or sending them into exile. This is a disappointed outcome
and we turn our attention to some alternative power indices to figure out if at least one of them
can confirm the outstanding position of the Medicean recognized by sociologists since decades. If
not, we have to ask whether the network representation correctly captures the historical facts or
if is it probably too stylized to replicate them.
Rather to count just the minimal winning coalitions to which a critical player can be belong
to, we enlarge the assessment basis while incorporating all winning coalitions. By doing so, we
compute the power distribution for the modified Holler index through Formula (2.8), which is
given by
φ MHI(N, v1) = (0.0595, 0.0720, 0.0676, 0.0680, 0.0667, 0.0577, 0.0758, 0.0583, 0.0895,
0.0552, 0.0623, 0.0688, 0.0638, 0.0686, 0.0662),
and the modified public value is specified by
pm(N, v1) = (3783, 4575, 4298, 4325, 4239, 3665, 4817, 3704, 5691,
3510, 3962, 4371, 4057, 4360, 4209).
Remind that these values count the winning coalitions to which a player k is a member. Inspection
of the power distribution reveals to us that the ranking of the most prominent families is also
10The power distribution has been multiplied by 100 to calculate the variance.
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preserved by the modified Holler index, i.e., the Medicean are placed on position one followed by
their rivals the Guadagni (7) and the Albizzi (2). Once more, we judge the attributed power to
the Strozzi clan (14) on rank 5 as underestimated. Contrasted to those, the attributed power to
all of them have been decreased and the distribution was more balanced. With even less power
attributed to the main actors and a smaller variance – just 0.7184 as recorded by Table 9.11 – as
compared to the Holler value, this power index characterization is all the more not able to support
the outstanding position of the Medici, and the decline of their rivals. This lead us straight away
to the Deegan-Packel index (2.9), which is quantified by
φDP Ik (N, v1) = (0.0520, 0.0879, 0.0721, 0.0735, 0.0647, 0.0374, 0.0914, 0.0389, 0.1179,
0.0271, 0.0561, 0.0727, 0.0697, 0.0730, 0.0656),
which returns exactly the same distribution as the Holler index. Hence, this index is also un-
suitable to support the historical facts. That let us immediately turn to the Johnston power
distribution that is quantified via Formula (2.10) through
φJI(N, v1) = (0.0231, 0.0881, 0.0615, 0.0627, 0.0547, 0.0181, 0.1238, 0.0198, 0.2744,
0.0116, 0.0331, 0.0676, 0.0470, 0.0646, 0.0498).
Again, we obtain by this power distribution the same ranking of the Medici, Guadagni, and the
Albizzi families. Even more clearly, their power attribution has been raised by this index. In
particular, the Medici clan is pleased with an over-proportional increment on power, their rank is
now further emphasized. Falling, nevertheless, far short of a blocking minority, if one considers
this level as a lower bound of political power that ought be at least attained to thwart the political
ambitions of the opponents, for instance, the 1433 subversion. Albeit the variance of the power
distribution as reported by Table 9.11 with a value of 41.679 is best so-far, we come up once more
with the conclusion that these figures can neither support the failure of this subversion nor to
mention the rise of the House of Medici. These outcomes let us refocus on the popular power
indices, namely the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf index. The Shapley-Shubik index defined by
Definition 2.1 provides the subsequent power distribution
φSSI(N, v1) = (0.0275, 0.0835, 0.0657, 0.0706, 0.0656, 0.0246, 0.1255, 0.0278, 0.1988,
0.0142, 0.0442, 0.0740, 0.0432, 0.0733, 0.0614).
Though the Shapley-Shubik power distribution reflects the ranking of the Medici and their main
rivals, and even attributes to all those more power than the Holler index, the outstanding position
of the Medicean cannot be supported. As shown by Table 9.11, the value of variance of 21.3984
indicates that the power distribution is still clustered too close around the mean, – i.e., is too
balanced – to assume a successful breakthrough of a clan as an all-embracing actor as it was
accomplished by the Medici. Thus, these figures cannot neither explain the prominence of the
Medici nor the decline of their rivals nor to explain the failure of the 1433 subversion.
Focusing on our power index analysis of the Banzhaf value (2.3), we get
φb(N, v1) = (0.0364, 0.0891, 0.0707, 0.0725, 0.0668, 0.0285, 0.1053, 0.0311, 0.1635,
0.0182, 0.0483, 0.0755, 0.0546, 0.0748, 0.0648).
The result reveals that the ranking of the main actors is preserved, but even here the data are
too weak to give support for the historical facts. As an interim result, we can record that none
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of the investigated power indices is able to sufficiently explain at least the outstanding position
of the Medicean. Hence, we have to take into consideration that the network structure is too
stylized to explain the real world with the consequence that some need arise to adjust our model
design. Before doing that, we want just – for the sake of completeness – to present the outcome
of pre-nucleolus, which is quantified by














































Even this distribution cannot provide any evidence for the historical events, though the ranking
of the main actors is preserved. A comparison of the results is shown in Table 9.2.
Although it seems that this is the end of the story, and that the solution concepts provided by
cooperative game theory are completely unsuitable to disentangle the power mesh of Florentine
politics, we have to remind ourselves that the pre-nucleolus possesses a marked position within
the bargaining range that is spanned by the pre-kernel whenever it is a set-valued solution. This
property, i.e., that it is generic not single-valuedness, is deemed by many scholars as a conceptual
defect, which turns in this context into a crucial advantage. Since the political institutions of
the Florentine Republic were aimed toward a balancing of interests within the elite, though the
system of checks and balances was vestigial and vulnerable with the consequence that it was
considered as legitimate to impose a political will by force. Nevertheless, an ideal milieu to apply
the pre-kernel as a solution which equalizes the bilateral claims for each pair of players and offering
a wide range of political settlements whenever it is not single-valued. Contrasted to the power
indices which are all single-valued and mainly offering a too balanced power distribution, that is,
putting too much power to the weak players that seems unsuitable to identify the main actors for
an epoch where the rule of force was predominant. Thus, we have to figure out if the pre-kernel
is single-valued or not.
For pursuing the latter piste, we have to study whether the imposed weighted majority game
has a homogeneous representation without any winning or veto-player to conclude that the pre-
kernel is a set-valued solution and span an enlarged settlement range. Clarifying that the game
has neither a winning nor a veto-player is left to the reader. In contrast, determining whether the
network weighted majority game has a homogeneous representation is a little bit more cumbersome
as for the case of the generic weighted majority game. Therefore, we endow the reader with some
assistance to answer this issue. Analogously, it requires to single out the set of minimal winning
coalitions, but now from the underlying sub-graph problem. Having them single out, one has
again to figure out that the cumulative vote equals the quorum for each minimal winning coalition
(cf. Formula (2.4)). Notice that a weighted majority game having a homogeneous representation
is said to be homogeneous, which can be affirmed in this case.
Apart from the homogeneity, we can figure out that the game possesses neither winning nor
veto-players. Due to Sudhölter (1996), we can draw the conclusion that the pre-kernel is a star-
shaped set-solution spanning some bargaining range. A non-empty subset X of the real vector
space Rn is denoted as a star whenever it contains an element x0 such that for every other element
x ∈ X the line segment constituted by the endpoints of x0 and x is contained in X . A vector x0
which satisfies this property is called a center solution of X . Obviously, a center solution needs
not to be unique. Moreover, for determining a pre-kernel element it is enough to consider the
minimal winning coalitions, since the maximum surplus of a player i over a player j is attained by
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a minimal winning coalition, for all pairs i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. Hence, balancedness of a pre-imputation
occurs on the set of minimal coalitions (cf. Peleg (1966); Sudhölter (1996)). Obviously, the pre-
nucleolus as part of the pre-kernel is determined by the set of minimal coalitions too. However,
identifying the set of minimal winning coalitions is much more harder than to determine the
maximum surpluses of players on the power set. Having identified this solution structure of the
pre-kernel, it is save to search for a second pre-kernel element. To find an additional pre-kernel
element, one can apply the method described by Algorithm 3.1. Having found a second point one
can apply the procedure discussed in Meinhardt (2014) to establish that this pre-kernel element –
in connection with the pre-nucleolus – is an endpoint of the line segment that forms the pre-kernel
solution of that game, hence the pre-kernel is given by the convex hull
PK (v1) = conv
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and having two center solutions, namely the endpoints. Moreover, the variance of the second
pre-kernel point is about 309.52. The largest value recognized so-far and indicating outstanding
positions.
Inspection of the found pre-kernel endpoint reveals to us two outstanding protagonists, namely
the Guadagni at coordinate seven and the Medici at coordinate nine. Finally, we get a result that
fits to one event of the historical accounts. The clash of Bernardo Guadagni with Cosimo de’
Medici. Recall that Bernardo Guadagni was the adversary who managed to arrest, imprison and
exile Cosimo de’ Medici that resulted in a political retaliation as the Medici managed to overturn
their banishment while returning back to Florence for taking revenge. The figures suggest that
both parties were of equal strength so that the final outcome cannot be predicted, but a clash
among these parties seem conceivable and supportable by this power distribution. Albeit these
figures seem to be convincing on a first glance, we have nevertheless to contrast them with the
historical events. It is well known that Bernardo became head of the government (Gonfaloniere)
by the support of Rinaldo degli Albizzi, who settled his debts in order to make him eligible for
office. And it was the pressure of Rinaldo that Cosimo was summoned and arrested by Bernardo
in September of 1433. Despite his liability against Rinaldo, the impecunious Bernardo was bribed
by Cosimo to retreat from office on health grounds that allowed him to escape from the death
sentence (cf. Hibbert (1974, pp. 49-51)). In this sense the data can only be interpreted as a
concealed operation, initiated by Rinaldo degli Albizzi behind the scenes.
For some, our first investigation of the Florentine elite marriage network by means of coopera-
tive game theory has established a surprising outcome. None of the presented power indices could
give sufficiently large support for an outstanding position of the Medici dynasty or of one of their
rival in Florentine politics. Solely by the second pre-kernel element, two outstanding protagonists
can be identified, and from which a link to a historical event can be drawn. A historical outcome
is never the result of a clear and unique chain of events. A wide variety of factors have determined
the issue, not a sole one. And it was for contemporaries not predictable at all of how events evolve
over time and what would be the final outcome. Apparently, they were aware of their opportu-
nities set, and how they can use it in their interest. But they could never be certain about the
next move of their opponents. An event, negligible to contemporaries, could incline the weighing
pan into one’s favor or disfavor. To capture a broader range of possible outcomes, single-valued
solution concepts are not flexible and sensitive enough, a flexibility that can be provided by a
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set-solution whenever it is not too large to slip off in arbitrariness or tautologies. The pre-kernel
as a set-solution that balances the maximum surpluses of each pair of players, i.e., their maximum
bilateral claims, and which may define a wider bargaining range in which a possible outcome may
materialize, can exactly accomplish this kind of task. Hence, we should not just regard it as a tool
for the investigation of the bargaining set with nice mathematical properties (cf. Peleg (1966)),
even though it was already realized by the same author that it represents an extreme form of
negotiation (cf. ibid. p.1), rather it ought to be considered as a useful tool to investigate market
behavior (cf. Ostmann and Meinhardt (2007, 2008); Meinhardt (2018)) or even of historical events
as in the case of Florentine politics to significantly explain the accession to power of the Medici
or the failure of their rivals. To what extent the pre-kernel can perform in this direction is the
subject matter to analysis in the remaining part of our study.
5.1 Some Modifications in the Model Setting
A crucial feature of the implemented network structure of Holler and Rupp (2020) was the un-
derlying assumption that each player node has equal weight implying that the weighted majority
graph problem was coded symmetrically. To take account of asymmetric power to control a net-
work of clansmen, we referring to the net-wealth as it was reported by Table 6 of Breiger and
Pattison (1986, p. 239)). During the Middle Ages and Renaissance people lived in hierarchical
societies that are based in most Italian cities on clientage systems. Financial means were used as
a vehicle to build up and to control a network of supporters in order to implement a collective
common action in the political decision-making process. It is indispensable that the accession
to power of the House of Medici had been taken place without the acquired fortune from their
banking activities. By these considerations, we use the net-wealth values as a proxy for financing
a clientage system and to exercise control on it. Reported net-wealth of the 1427 catasto are
denominated on thousand florins, where we use the rounded values as they are provided by the R
software package netrankr of Schoch (2020a). From the data panel, the entry of the Pucci family
is once again removed. Hence, the weight vector of net-wealth is represented by the subsequent
array of positive integers
w1w = (10, 36, 55, 44, 20, 32, 8, 42, 103, 48, 49, 27, 10, 146, 48),
to which we refer to as w1w. This ranking of net-wealth is basically supported by the source
of de Roover (1966, p. 28), who identified from the catasto of 1427 Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici
on the third place rather on second, surpassed by the Panciatichi brothers and Palla Strozzi.
Thirty years later, the catasto of 1457 records that the Medici were by far the richest family
(cf. ibid p.28). Nevertheless, we have to be cautious in interpreting these reported net-wealth
data at face value. As was it emphasized by Hibbert (1974, p. 60), Cosimo de’ Medici was
a prudent men who kept special accounts while exaggerating bad debts with the intention to
declare a much lower taxable fortune than it really was. This implies that the wealth situation
of the Medici is undervalued, and their power may be underestimated too. However, creative
accounting can also be expected for the other main actors in Florentine politics, albeit the extent
is unclear and whether the effect is statistically offset. More crucially we judge that the Medici –
as bankers operating on an international level with branches spread across Europe – were able to
dissemble their fortune before the eyes of their adversary, as it did Cosimo de’ Medici in autumn
of 1433 shortly before he was arrested while transferring huge amount of sums of money from
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his bank in Florence to his branches in Rome and Naples to keep them safe from confiscation
by the Albizzi (cf. ibid. p.49). Due to this smart hedging of his fortune, all attempts of Rinaldo
degli Albizzi failed to bankrupt him during his exile of 1433-1434 (cf. ibid. p.54). A practice
he picked up later to secure his power while using the Florentine taxation system to break his
enemies (cf. ibid. p.61). From this point of view, the net-wealth figure reported by the catasto
for the Medici is certainly undervalued.
Despite these doubts and in the absence of any better and more sound data set we still make
use of them. Pursuing our analysis in this direction, we assume a simple majority rule through
the quorum to q1w = 340. We denote the associated simple game by 〈N, v1w〉. Then the adjusted
weighted majority graph problem is specified by wMP1w =: (G1, w1w, q1w). For getting the reference
solution, the Holler index, associated to this new underlying graph problem is provided by
φ HI(N, v1w) = (0.0335, 0.0871, 0.0780, 0.0835, 0.0664, 0.0390, 0.0945, 0.0524, 0.1115,
0.0378, 0.0640, 0.0731, 0.0615, 0.0500, 0.0676),
and the distribution of the public values are given by
p(N, v1w) = (55, 143, 128, 137, 109, 64, 155, 86, 183, 62, 105, 120, 101, 82, 111).
Comparing the power distribution of the Holler index with the initial graph problem wMP1 reveals
that the main actors getting less power though their ranking is preserved, and the variance is
diminished from 5.2618 to 4.9081. Though the Peruzzi (11) gained on power, whereas the Strozzi
(14) as the most wealthy family in accordance with the catasto is still losing power and amplifying
their unimportance, which is astonishing while falling short of their actual influence. Once again
the result does not mimic the historical facts, and the Holler index seems not be a suitable for
that purpose. This lets us immediately turn to the Johnston index that performed best from all
other power indices but not good enough during the foregoing analysis to explain the historical
events. To this end, computing the Johnston index gives
φJI(N, v1w) = (0.0033, 0.0380, 0.0689, 0.0609, 0.0588, 0.0082, 0.0637, 0.0129, 0.2304,
0.0069, 0.0291, 0.1165, 0.0113, 0.2516, 0.0395).
This power distribution is still clustered too close around the mean with a variance of 59.6757
(cf. Table 9.11) so that none of the figures can be designated as outstanding, and does not provide
any support to the historical events either. Neither it places the Medici on the first rank nor it
preserves the ranking of the other families. Remarkable is the fact that another great rival of
the Medici assumes their place as the most accentuated actor, that is the Strozzi clan. This is
surprising from the point of view of the previous investigation, there all indices have not attributed
to them the strength of an equivalent rival of the Medici family, rather one had to classify them as
a negligible political actor without any means to influence an event in their favor. Astonished, one
has to recognize that the Strozzi – in accordance with this power distribution – are stronger than
the Medici. Probably strong enough to prevent their rise to power. Knowing that the records
are speaking a totally different language, we have to assess this power attribution as excessive.
Another distinctive feature is the third rank of the Ridolfi, though this family produced Lorenzo
Ridolfi (1362-1443) and Breiger and Pattison (1986) made them an object of investigation of
the block analysis, their political influence seems exaggerated too (cf. Table 9.2). Obviously
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contradicting the annals in respect thereof. Observing that the above distribution has completely
reversed the trend, we dismiss it. Letting us focus on the pre-nucleolus instead, which does not
change the trend either as we notify through














































This distribution attributes the highest power to the Strozzi (14), followed by the Medici (9),
Barbadori (3), Albizzi (2), and Peruzzi (11), however, the accentuated position of the Ridolfi
was with rank 9 not confirmed. Hence, it mainly preserved the previous ranking on the first two
position, though it adjusts their power downward. With a variance of 38.8377 (cf. Table 9.11)
an outstanding position of the Medici or any other major protagonist in the Florentine politics
cannot be affirmed. In the same vein, the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf value failed to explain
the historical incidents (see Table 9.3). This lets us remind that the pre-nucleolus as part of the
pre-kernel reflects only a marked position within the settlement range spanned by a set-valued pre-
kernel solution. For a homogeneous weighted majority game without winning or veto-players the
set-valuedness of the pre-kernel is guaranteed. Apparently, this representation is not homogeneous
implying that in advance no conclusion about the shape can be drawn, nevertheless, the pre-kernel
is constituted by the line segment given by
PK (v1w) = conv
{

















































with two center solutions, namely the endpoints. Moreover, the variance of the second endpoint
is about 130.95, and it reveals that the set of actors can be reduced to four main actors. All of
them can be classified due to the variance as outstanding. These protagonists are the Medici, the
Strozzi, and the Guadagni as one may expect by the historical incidents, but not, as one might
expect the Albizzi clan, the enemies of the Medici, as the fourth main actor in Florentine politics,
rather a new major actor appears with the Barbadori. This result is surprising, since this clan was
neither recognized as a principal actor in the chronicles nor can we assign to them an outstanding
position within the network structure of the Graph 1. Analogously to the historical accounts – in
particular, Hibbert (1974); Padgett and Ansell (1993) assigned them to the Albizzi faction – they
occupied just a peripheral position there, albeit the 1427 catasto ranked them on position three
after the Strozzi and Medici, but outstripping the Albizzi and Guadagni (cf. wealth vector w1w on
Page 25). Though Niccolò Barbadori was one of those seventy names who felt the revenge of the
Medici party while being banished (cf. Hibbert (1974, p. 58)). Or do we have determined a novel
main actor whose role in the Florentine power struggle was not really recognized by historians?
We cannot answer this question, since it goes beyond our analysis. Nevertheless, this issue is
interesting enough to resume this thread in Subsection 7 again to exclude that it was an unique
event.
5.2 Including the Combined Ties into the Network Structure
Although the pre-kernel solution confirmed three main protagonists who played a principal role
in the Florentine republic, the result seems disputable on the ground that it even assigns an
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outstanding position to the Barbadori clan that could not be affirmed by the annals. From this
point of view, we have to contest our approach, and we consider some need to redesign the model
in order to grasp better the underlying mesh of power between the leading families. For modifying
the game model in this direction, we introduce in the marriage network of the above 16 families,
the number of combined business and marriage ties to whom each family is connected across all
116 families as it was reported by Table 6 of Breiger and Pattison (1986, p. 239)). Thus, we
impose on the network structure with its 16 families an additional layer to take account in a
stylized form the more rich and comprehensive family relations of the Florentine elite in the hope
to increase the gravity of the main families in order to entangle their power network.
The combined number of business and marriage ties are quantified by the subsequent array
w1t = (2, 3, 14, 9, 18, 9, 14, 14, 54, 7, 32, 4, 5, 29, 7).
Noteworthy is the fact that the Albizzi dynasty, as the actual ruler of the republic of Florence,
counts just three family ties. Contrasted to the 54 ties of the Medici clan as best integrated actor
in the Florentine mesh of power. Applying again a majority voting rule, the quorum q1t is set to
111. The associated simple game is denoted by 〈N, v1t〉. By far the Johnston index performed
best from all power indices, we provide its power distribution by
φJI(N, v1t) = (0.0015, 0.0268, 0.0880, 0.0522, 0.0866, 0.0060, 0.0801, 0.0118, 0.3405,
0.0031, 0.0582, 0.0804, 0.0076, 0.1297, 0.0275).
Inspection of the power distribution reveals that the Medici (9) are positioned on the first rank
followed by the Strozzi (14), Barbadori (3), Castellani (5), Ridolfi (12), Guadagni (7), and Peruzzi
(11). According to these figures the Albizzi and Guadagni do not play a principal role in the power
struggle. This is not surprising, since their network ties with 3 respective 14 combined counts seem
too weak of considering them as principal actors. A distinctive feature is that the Ridolfi with just
4 ties are surpassing from rank 13 to 5. In comparison to the previous analysis of the Johnston
index, they lose two places, since they lose some power. In relation to the other main actors, their
power seem to excessive. These both counterfactual results contradicting the historical facts.
Nevertheless, the variance of the power distribution in accordance with the Johnston index is
close to 72.8866, it is the highest value w.r.t. the investigated sample of power indices letting us
to identify a quasi outstanding position of the Medicean and Strozzi.
In the next step, we want again study the pre-kernel solution, as a solution concept that
performed by far best in replicating the relative strength of actors in the Republic of Florence.
For doing so, we have to remember that for getting a pre-kernel element we need to apply the
Algorithm 3.1. The presentation of the pre-nucleolus is skipped her, since it performs worse than
the Johnston index. The solution can be retrieved from Table 9.4. For convenience sake, we
just mention the ranking of the first five actors and the variance. These are the Medici, Strozzi,
Guadagni, Castellani, and Barbadori with a variance of 49.05 assigning no outstanding positions.
Although the pre-nucleolus can be eliminated on this ground, we turn our attention to the pre-
kernel solution to find an element that may mirror the reported power configuration of the annals.
To follow this direction, we need to figure out whether the game has a homogeneous representation
or not. If the game is homogeneous without any winning or veto-player it is star-shaped, if not,
its shape cannot be anticipated in advance. To make things much more complicated in the latter
case, we cannot even expect that the pre-kernel is connected whenever it is set-valued. Some
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examples of weighted majority games with a disconnected pre-kernel are given by Kopelowitz
(1967) and Stearns (1968). In Meinhardt (2013b, Section 8.5) a selected example of Kopelowitz
was extensively discussed. Here, we are going to present a new example of a non-homogeneous
weighted majority game having a disconnected pre-kernel. Before we present the disconnected
pre-kernel of the game, we focus by an initial step on a pre-kernel element that can be support




















We observe that it attributes for the Medici the highest power, and places again the Strozzi and
Guadagni on position two. The variance of the vector is about 101.19, indicating outstanding
positions to the Medici, Peruzzi, Strozzi and the Guadagni, for the last three figures of equal
strength. Striking is the fact that for the first time the Peruzzi are emphasized with an out-
standing position in Florentine politics in accordance with that power distribution. Followed by
the Barbadori and Castellani, both are attributed by Padgett and Ansell (1993, p. 1289) to the
Peruzzi faction. Except for the Albizzi, – which is not surprising due to their negligible counts of
combined ties – this distribution identifies the major protagonists of the events dated for the pe-
riod 1433-1434. Providing some empirical evidence that the principles of distributive arbitration
in accordance with the pre-kernel may be a basis of a political decision making process.
As hinted in one previous paragraph, the pre-kernel is disconnected, which is constituted by
three convex sets, namely a rhombus, a line segment, and as an isolated point, the pre-nucleolus.
Applying the methods described by Meinhardt (2014) the extent of each of these separated convex
set-valued objects can be easily specified. The rhombus is the convex hull constituted by four

















































































































































































Investigating of the extreme points reveals that the rank order of the first eight positions is
identical, except for the second extreme point, where the Peruzzi and the Strozzi exchange their
positions. Thus, the order of the eight largest figures is given as follows: apparently the Medici
on the first position, followed then by the Peruzzi, Strozzi, Guadagni, Castellani, Barbadori,
Albizzi, and finally the Bischeri. Establishing that the ranking of the five major actors is not
preserved from the Johnston index. Recalling for convenience sake its ranking, which is given by
the Medici, Strozzi, Barbadori, Castellani, and finally the Ridolfi. Contrasted to the discussed
pre-kernel element from above, which orders the main four protagonist accordingly. Though the
variances of the pre-kernel set S1 are far from reaching the foregoing levels with the consequences
that these power distributions cannot give any strong support of the historical accounts. The
distributions are clustered to close around the mean. Hence, we discard them on the ground that
they do not provide any empirical evidence.
Analogously to the former set, we get the second set while applying the methods of Meinhardt
(2014) to determine from an extreme point the whole line segment. Notice that the second
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The first endpoint has a higher variance than the second, i,e., 108.63 versus 101.19, identifies
the same protagonists, except for the Peruzzi, reducing the power of those and the Medici while
redistributing it to the aforementioned actors with the consequence that now the Strozzi and
Guadagni are of equal strength with the Medici.
This line segment offering a wide range of possible outcomes on which the bilateral claims
are balanced among each pair of players, implying by its axiomatization that no subgroup of
players should have an incentive to deviate from an agreement and to play their own game in
order to improve their situation. Offering a wide range of political settlements on which the main
protagonists could find an equilibrium of interests rather than an outbreak of conflict. However,
it is hardly conceivable that the leading Florentine families had an unified perception of fairness
making it less likely that they had agreed upon on the set of principles of distributive arbitration
(axioms) related to the pre-kernel or any other solution, though the Florentine institutions were
designed to obtain a balance of interests among the oligarchs. And even if, a pre-kernel settle-
ment would be contestable on the simple reasoning that it could not be stabilized by a figure
of argumentation that is based on the balance of claims, since their understanding of fairness
were too different and driven by subject feelings. Elucidating that one cannot expect despite a
homogeneous mesh of relations among the oligarchs an unitary, cohesive, and purposeful action.
Making it impossible to predict the outcome of the game on the basis of these distributions, an
outcome finally determined by factors that cannot be grasped by the game model. Nevertheless,
it reveals the main figures from the annals and that no event was so apparent after the fact.
Establishing that the political equilibrium was fragile, and a small disturbance may determine
the final outcome. In this context, we have to remind that the Guadagni are acting on the behalf
of the Albizzi, and these endpoints allowing us of making the links to two extreme events: on the
one hand the arrest and exile of the Medici, but on the other hand their revenge and prominence.
In the former event, the Peruzzi acting as observer while trying to profit from the event with
minimal effort, whereas in the latter case, the power of the Medici revived, which was ignored
by their enemies, since one supposed the backing of the Strozzi, Barbadori and the strengthened
Peruzzi, but was unable to conduct a joint and coherent action. Though the power of the Medici
overshadow their opponents, they seem nevertheless not strong enough to subdue them. However,
the chronicles report that by ignorance, passivity and disunity of their main rivals, the Medici
were be able to outmaneuver them and to impose on them their will.
To conclude, the pre-kernel is the union of these two sets in connection with the pre-nucleolus,
hence PK (v1t) = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ν
∗(N, v1t). Moreover, it best identifies the main historical protag-
onists of the Republic of Florence of all investigated solution concepts.
6 Florentine Elite Marriages Reconsidered
As aforementioned, Rinaldo degli Albizzi was the actual ruler behind the scenes of the Republic
of Florence during the time period from 1429 till September 1434. Though Bernardo Guadagni
was the elected Gonfaloniere, he acted on behalf of Rinaldo, who settled his debts to become
eligible for office. Both families were members of the old oligarchs, lived in the same quarter, had
close family ties, and were enemies of the Medici, albeit Bernardo refrained from his enmity by a
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sufficient large amount of bribe money from Cosimo. Despite this latter limitation, the fact that
Bernardo insisted of a reciprocal recognition and on his status equality, one may consider both
families as an unity. As a side effect, this would uncover the actual power structures. Even though
we may consider them as a single actor that does not mean that we can just add their power.
Not every solution concept applied in our network analysis satisfies additivity. Although we
assume that both families form an à priori union, we have nevertheless to conduct a completely
new investigation from scratch. By the annals, the Albizzi played the more prominent role in
Florentine politics, that’s why we follow Holler and Rupp (2020) while assigning for simplicity
the network links of the Guadagni to the Albizzi, and treating them as a null-player, albeit the
gravity of the node, i.e., the number of votes, remains unaltered by their unification as one may






























Figure 2: Florentine Elite Marriages 1395-1434: Priori Union Between Albizzi and Guadagni11
This undirected graph of Figure 2 represented in form of an edge matrix by
mE2 =
[
1 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 5 5 2 2 9 9 9 10 11 12 12
9 6 9 5 9 4 11 14 11 14 8 15 12 13 15 13 14 14 15
]
,
and the decision rule is set to the quorum q2 = 8, so that the weighted majority graph problem
11The adjusted network data set with à priori union between the Albizzi and Guadagni families of the Florentine
Elite Marriages is based on the file florentine_m that ships with the R software package netrankr Schoch (2020a).
This network was taken from Figure 2 of Holler and Rupp (2020).
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based on Graph 2 is given by
wMP2 := (G2, [1, 1, . . . , 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
5 times




In the sequel, we referring to the associated simple game as 〈N, v2〉, which is again a 15-person
game having in total 32767 non-empty coalitions.
For comparing the power index distribution obtained by Holler and Rupp (2020, p. 11) with
our result, which is given by
φ HI(N, v2) = (0.0581, 0.1114, 0.0745, 0.0788, 0.0673, 0.0532, 0, 0.0532, 0.1199,
0.0347, 0.0622, 0.0722, 0.0794, 0.0728, 0.0622),
and the distribution of the public values are given by
p(N, v2) = (273, 523, 350, 370, 316, 250, 0, 250, 563, 163, 292, 339, 373, 342, 292).
Recall that family 7, the Guadagni, are treated as null-player, hence the Holler index attributes
to them a power of zero. The above power and public value distributions are identical to the
results obtained by Holler and Rupp (2020). Of course, the Medicean are ranked on the first
place followed by the Albizzi, actually the Albizzi-Guadagni. However, we treat the Guadagni
as null-player so that we just referring to the Albizzi, though we have to keep in mind that
they formed an à priori union with the Guadagni. Furthermore, we place the Salviati before the
Bischeri, then appears the Barbadori, the Strozzi and the Ridolfi,. Apparently, the Medici have
an accentuated position like the Albizzi, but the power of the Strozzi falling short of their actual
significance. The variance has increased from 5.2618 to 8.008 (cf. Table 9.11), but this value is
still too low to indicate to the Medici or Albizzi an outstanding position. Analogously to page 21,
we do not attribute to this power distribution any significant evidence for supporting the annals.
From all indices, the Johnston index performed best in the foregoing examinations of the
power structure, for that reason we list its distribution through
φJI(N, v2) = (0.0282, 0.1910, 0.0599, 0.0664, 0.0562, 0.0259, 0, 0.0259, 0.2749,
0.0152, 0.0383, 0.0594, 0.0623, 0.0593, 0.0372).
This distribution has the highest variance of all power indices, it is about 51.8961. Apparently,
this value is lower than for the Johnston index of game v1t (cf. Table 9.11). Thus, this power
distribution as well as any other distribution cannot give any strong support for an outstanding
position of any major actor like the Medici or Albizzi. For sake of completeness, we want just
mention that in comparison to the Holler index, the Bischeri and Salviati change their positions
as well as the Ridolfi and Strozzi. All index solutions in connection with the pre-nucleolus can be
retrieved from Table 9.5.
After having investigated the power indices, we turn our attention to the pre-kernel solution
to figure out if it could provide some higher evidence to reflect the accounts. For doing so,
homogeneity of the game must be checked in a first step, which can be confirmed. Then we
must test on the presence of any winning or veto-player, which can be denied. Therefore, the
pre-kernel is star-shaped. To determine its exact shape, we apply the procedure of Meinhardt
(2014) to establish that it spans a bargaining range constituted by the pre-nucleolus and the point
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(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)/2. Hence, the pre-kernel has the same structure as game v1, it
is a convex hull
PK (v2) = conv {(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)/2,
(2, 8, 4, 4, 4, 2, 0, 2, 9, 2, 4, 4, 3, 4, 4)/56},
with two center solutions, namely the endpoints, whereas the first endpoint of the pre-kernel
segment has a variance of 309.52 providing strong support of an outstanding position of the
Medici and Albizzi. Notice that the Albizzi has inherited the power of the Guadagni of game v1.
Both protagonists have equal strength and it is therefore not predictable who can assert oneself
against the other. Hence, we may make the link to the clash of Rinaldo degli Albizzi with Cosimo
de’ Medici. Contrasted to the identified clash of Bernardo Guadagni with Cosimo on page 24, the
present power distribution replicates the actual accounts, and do not place Rinaldo behind the
scenes.
6.1 Including the Net-Wealth into the Network Structure
Analogously to the foregoing investigation of Section 5 we deviate from the assumption of equal
gravity for each node while taking account of asymmetries within the network structure. As an
initial step, we refer to the net-wealth data as they were reported by Breiger and Pattison (1986,
p. 239)) to overcome the underestimation of the Strozzi clan by the foregoing analysis. Pursuing
the study in this direction, the adjusted net-wealth vector is given by
w2w = (10, 44, 55, 44, 20, 32, 0, 42, 103, 48, 49, 27, 10, 146, 48),
to which we refer to as w2w. Finally, we impose a simple majority voting rule given by the
subsequent quorum q2w = 340, whereas the undirected graph G2 remains unaltered. Hence, the
modified weighted majority graph problem based on Graph 2 is specified by
wMP2w := (G2, w2w, q2w).
A summary of the results is grasped in Table 9.6. Here, we restrict ourselves to present the
main ingredients of the results. Firstly, the public good index ranks the Medici before the Albizzi,
but failed to support the position of the Strozzi. Moreover, the variance is with 9.7811 rather
weak to recognize for any main protagonist of the chronicles an outstanding position, that’s why
we dismiss this index on that ground. Again the Johnston index performs best. The variance of
its power distribution is highest of all power indices pointing out a figure of 58.9851, though in our
opinion, not high enough to recognize for any major actor any outstanding position. Nevertheless,
it identifies the Strozzi, Medici and Albizzi as a leading actors, in this order. The Strozzi clearly
outstrips the Albizzi, and they are even stronger than the Medici. In comparison with game v1t
they lose some power, but not as much as the Medici (cf. Table 9.3). Making them relatively
more powerful, and making it much more likelier to prevent the rise of Medici. Once more, we
consider on this ground their power as overestimated.
Concerning the pre-nucleolus, it attributes the same ranking as under the Johnston index, and
provides the Medici as well as the Strozzi with almost the same power, but reduces the power
of the Strozzi. However, not sufficiently enough to reverse the trend. Therefore, we consider
also the power of the Strozzi as overvalued under the pre-nucleolus. This lets us turn to the
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pre-kernel to identify a bargaining range that fits better with the annals. By doing so, we test
on homogeneity, which can be denied. Thus, we may expect a disconnected pre-kernel, but even
this can be rejected, though it is a non-convex set given by the union of the three line segments
having as its center the pre-nucleolus. To be more precise, these three line segments are
S1 = conv {(0, 24, 18, 12, 6, 3, 0, 3, 40, 4, 12, 6, 4, 42, 12)/186,
(0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1)/10},
S2 = conv {(0, 24, 18, 12, 6, 3, 0, 3, 40, 4, 12, 6, 4, 42, 12)/186,
(0, 2, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0)/8},
S3 = conv {(0, 24, 18, 12, 6, 3, 0, 3, 40, 4, 12, 6, 4, 42, 12)/186,
(0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1)/8},
and the pre-kernel is formed by PK (v2w) = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. The distribution of the endpoint
of the second line segment has highest variance with 108.63 indicating outstanding positions to
the Medici, Albizzi and Strozzi, but contrasted to the power indices with equal strength. One
may think that the Strozzi and Albizzi were together strong enough to prevent the rise of the
Medici, so why not add them together. First of all the pre-kernel is not an additive solution.
Secondly, we have to remind that the oligarchs network was unable to conduct an unitary, cohesive,
and purposeful action. And though both families “were patrician to the core” (cf. Padgett and
Ansell (1993, p. 1284)), mainly follow the same interests, consider the Medici as their enemies,
they nevertheless follow different political agendas. In addition, the Strozzi were extremely rich
bankers allowing them to retain their independence, and judge every political action under the
angle whether it is bad for business or not. Under this perspective we have to classify that
Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Palla Strozzi pulling in the same direction during the subversion of
1433 as Rinaldo tried to assemble more troops, he got the support of Palla, though their effort
were offset by other supporters changing their mind (cf. ibid. p.1279). But Palla, a moderate in
Florentine politics, committed desertion as Rinaldo claimed death sentence against Cosimo while
those got backing from mighty foreign customers – like the Pope – of the Medici Bank with the
consequence that Rinaldo had finally to accept Cosimo’s banishment instead (cf. Hibbert (1974,
p. 52)). From this context, this distribution may make the link of Cosimo’s exile.
6.2 Including the Combined Ties into the Network Structure
Pursuant to Subsection 5.2 we include now the combined business and marriage ties to change
the gravity of the nodes. Due to the fact that the Albizzi and Guadagni form an à priori union,
and the Guadagni are treated as null-player, we attribute their ties to the Albizzi clan while
augmenting their counts from 3 to 17, and annihilating their gravity, then the weights vector is
specified by
w2t = (2, 17, 14, 9, 18, 9, 0, 14, 54, 7, 32, 4, 5, 29, 7),
whereas the quorum remains unaltered with q2t = 111. Apparently the weighted majority graph
problem is still based on Graph 2, and is given by
wMP2t := (G2, w2t, q2t).
Table 9.7 contains a synopsis for the results of the power indices and pre-nucleolus. Here,
we confine ourselves to the indices that support best the annals. First of all, we referring to the
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power distribution of the Johnston index with a variance of 80.3623, the best value seen by far
for a power index. Identifying as major protagonists the Medici, Albizzi, and Strozzi, followed by
the Barbadori. Thus, incorporating the cumulated business and marriage ties into the network
structure and attributing the power of the Guadagni to the actual ruler of the Florentine politics
bring to the fore the Albizzi while revealing their power, and place them on the second position.
Disentangling the real power structure, and revealing who is the actual antagonist of the Medici.
Allowing us of pointing to the revenge and prominence of the Medici while attributing them a
power of 0.353 that overshadows the power of the Albizzi with 0.126 and those of the Strozzi with
0.1141. Still we do not consider the Medici as strong enough to subdue their rivals and to impose
on them their will. Though we have to remember that it was ignorance, passivity and disunity of
their main rivals that allow them to seize the power in the Republic of Florence, and incline the
weighing pan into their favor. Nevertheless, we judge the variance still not as sufficient enough
to give any significant support for making a link to the annals.
Turning to the pre-nucleolus shows that the variance of its distribution is worse than the
distribution of the Johnston index, hence we dismiss it (cf. Table 9.11). Even worse is the
situation for the Shapley-Shubik index or Banzhaf value. Letting us again immediately turn to
the per-kernel as a solution that settles the bilateral claims of the pair of players, providing a
wide range of outcomes where actors should be able to manage a balance of interests. In this
context, we have to recall that the political institutions of the Florentine Republic were oriented
toward equalizing the interests between the oligarchs, since only within a pacified state, bankers
and traders found the environment for running a successful and profitable business implying
that the pre-kernel solution ought to be best adapted for such a milieu, we have nevertheless
to remind ourselves that the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance was an era of the right to
private warfare. Thus, the political equilibrium was fragile, and the main protagonist considered
it as legitimate to impose on the political decision process the rule of force making it difficult to
anticipate the final outcome.
It is worth noting an interesting difference between the pre-kernel element determined for game
v1t, and its counterpart for the current game while providing a power distribution with an equal
variance of 101.19. Striking is fact that ceteris paribus the Albizzi and Guadagni interchange




















Hence, the Albizzi taking the part of the Guadagni, and the distribution bring to the fore the
actual ruler, who had so far been covered up behind the scenes. Enabling us to identify all major
protagonists of the events dated for the period 1433-1434, namely, the Medici, Albizzi, Strozzi
and the Peruzzi, the last three with equal strength. And due to the variance, all major actors can
be attributed outstanding positions.
The game has not a homogeneous representation and possesses a pre-kernel that is discon-
nected, which is constituted by three line segments. Again applying the procedures described
by Meinhardt (2014) the extent of each of these separated line segments can be easily specified
through
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S1 = conv
{
(0, 8, 4, 2, 4, 1, 0, 1, 12, 0, 4, 2, 0, 6, 2)/46,















































(0, 2, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0)/12,
(0, 2, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0)/8
}
,
and the pre-kernel is formed by PK (v2t) = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. Line segment S3 is offering by its
endpoints highest variances, and therefore outstanding positions to the major actors allowing to
make the link to two historical events, that is, the arrest and exile of the Medici by the latter
endpoint, their revenge and seize of power by the former. Contrasted to Subsection 5.2, this time
with the correct sign, the Albizzi onstage.
7 Florentine Elite Business Relations
We continue the power index analysis of the Florentine family network while focusing on those






















Figure 3: Florentine Elite Business Relations 1395-143412
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This removes the Acciaiuolli, Albizzi, Pucci, Ridolfi, and Strozzi from the network structure,
since to those no intratrade relations can be assigned (cf. Table 4.2), leading to a reduced form
of the weighted majority graph problem based on Figure 3, to which we refer to as G3.
To get the associated simple game, we follow the assumptions made by Holler and Rupp (2020,
p. 12) to assign to each player node an equal weight of one, and just apply a simple majority rule.
Hence, the set of agents has cardinality 11, for all k ∈ N , an agent k has a weight of wk = 1, and
the quorum is set to q = 6, so that the weighted majority graph problem based on Table 4.2 is
given by




As described above, these information are enough to derive a voting game. Whereas the undirected
graph G3 from Figure 3 is represented in form of an edge matrix through
mE3 =
[
3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 9 9
5 6 9 11 7 8 11 8 11 9 8 11 10 13 15
]
,
The undirected graph from Figure 3 has in total 15 edges that is captured in the associated edge
matrix mE3, whereas the matrix used by Holler and Rupp (2020, p. 12) has just 14 edges. We
referring to the associated simple game as 〈N, v3〉, which has in total 11 non null-players and 4
null-players. It would be sufficient to just rely on the 11-person representation, but computing
the associated 15-person game with its 32767 non-empty coalitions is under MATLAB no great
deal, which requires some additional seconds of computation time.13. Applying the representation
used by these authors, we are able to reproduce their results of the public good index and public
values. Using the edge matrix mE3, we get in lieu thereof
φ HI(N, v3) = (0, 0, 0.1667, 0.0718, 0.0949, 0.0718, 0.0486, 0.0949, 0.1528,
0.0602, 0.1181, 0, 0.0602, 0, 0.0602),
and the distribution of the public values are given by
p(N, v3) = (0, 0, 72, 31, 41, 31, 21, 41, 66, 26, 51, 0, 26, 0, 26).
The distribution of the public good index reveals that there are in total 15 players in the game
rather than 11. Four of them are receiving nothing indicating that those are treated as null-players.
These are the Acciaiuolli (1), Albizzi (2), Ridolfi (12), and Strozzi (14).
Restricting the positioning of the public value distribution to the first five families, places the
Barbadori on first with a public value of 77, followed by the Medici (66), Peruzzi (51), finally the
Castellani (41) and Lamberteschi (41) with equal strength. Contrasted to the order from Holler
and Rupp (2020, p. 13) with the Barbadori on first having a public value of 56, whereas the Medici
(51) and Peruzzi (51) doing equally well. Four families have a public good value of 25, three of
12The applied network data set of the Florentine Business Relations is part of the file flo_business that ships with
the R software package networkdata of Schoch (2020b) that is based on Table 1 of Breiger and Pattison (1986),
see also Table 4.2.
13The evaluation time of the routine from our toolbox MatTuGames 2020a to determine the simple games needed
in general not more than 10 seconds on a thin compute node with 40 cores of the Intel Xeon Gold 6230 processor
and 90 GB physical memory.
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21, and the Guadagni are the last with a value 15. The above power distribution has by far with
a variance of 28.5334 highest value ever attributed to the public good index, however, we judge
its value still as too weak to assign to any figure an outstanding position.
A synopsis of the results can be retrieved from Table 9.8. In the course, we confine the
discussion of the results to the Johnston, Shapley-Shubik index and the pre-nucleolus as a solution
that is heavily based on bargaining considerations.
φJI(N, v3) = (0, 0, 0.3745, 0.0388, 0.0781, 0.0419, 0.0267, 0.0614, 0.1983,
0.0229, 0.1117, 0, 0.0229, 0, 0.0229).
The power distribution has a variance of 100.59 and attributes to the Barbadori, Medici, and
Peruzzi outstanding positions. Remarkable is that the Barbadori are positioned at the first place
with a power of 0.3745, they widely overshadow the Medici with 0.1983 as well as the Peruzzi with
0.1117. This is astonishing, since like the Peruzzi and Strozzi, they are just regarded as an ally
of the Albizzi. Neither they did play a dominant role during the events of 1433-1434 nor it was
recorded that they dominated the course of business. Though their remarkable position seems to
be surprising w.r.t. the chronicles, this is not anymore the case by a more thorough inspection
of the Graph 3, which reveals that they occupied a very central position within the network
contrasted to the Graphs 1 and 2, where they just inhabited at the periphery. As it becomes
more clear when we are going to discuss the pre-nucleolus, they hold now an inevitable position in
the underlying graph problem wMP3, i.e., all successful relations between the families must run via
the Barbadori. Even though the discussed power indices intrinsically balancing the distribution
of power among the players, they are also performance-based measures while satisfying in general
local monotonicity, an exception is the Holler or public good index. Implying that the seized
position by the Barbadori must be compensated by an increase in power as it was registered for
the Johnston index. The assignment of power to the Barbadori is much more impressive for the
Shapley-Shubik index, as we observe through
φSSI(N, v3) = (0.0000, 0.0000, 0.4276, 0.0435, 0.0792, 0.0522, 0.0355, 0.0585, 0.1419,
0.0224, 0.0943, 0.0000, 0.0224, 0.0000, 0.0224).
Moreover, the variance of the power distribution with 115.91 is also much higher than under
the Johnston index that intensifies their outstanding position. Apart of the Barbadori, even the
Medici as well as the Peruzzi can be assigned with the attribute outstanding. Preserving the
ranking of the identified principal protagonists. However, even this result will be outperformed
by the pre-nucleolus.
This is due that the Barbadori family occupy a central position within the graph making them
to an inevitable player for forming a winning coalition. As one can directly observe by Graph 3,
the Barbadori subdivides the graph into two equal sub-graphs having each 6 nodes, where the
Barbadori clue them together. Therefore, each winning coalition needs the Barbadori, otherwise
they are loosing. Under the figure of argumentation of the pre-kernel, the negotiation power of
the Barbadori is so strong that they push each other family against their outside option. An
actor i other than the Barbadori cannot claim an amount that goes beyond the outside option,
otherwise this can be countered by j while referring to those coalitions that contain j but not i
(cf. Meinhardt (2013b, Chap. 3)). Noteworthy is that the player set is complete and directed, in
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which the Barbadori as a power of veto is the most desirable actor, which must be recompensed
by the other actors. By homogeneity and veto-player, the pre-kernel is single-valued and coincides
with the pre-nucleolus, and assigning the total spoil to the veto-player at position 3. Thus, it
quantifies by
PK (v3) = ν
∗(N, v3) = {(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)},
with a variance of 666.667. The highest variance ever seen, and attributing solely to the Barbadori
an outstanding position. A prominence never indicated in the annals. This lets us infer that the
network structure of Graph 3 is too stylized of identifying the actual actors. That these business
mesh is thinned out, can be immediately recognized that neither the Ridolfi nor the Strozzi have
any commercial links. On a first glance, it is hardly conceivable that the Ridolfi as traders should
not have any commercial relations with the other families. More astonishing is the missing of
the Strozzi. As the second largest bank behind the Medici Bank, the fact that the Strozzi are
according to the catasto richer than the Medici, and in permanent rivalry with them on political
and financial supremacy, should not have any business links, does not seem possible.14 We
conclude that these thinned out business relations certainly do not correctly replicate the trade
links between the Florentine families. Most of these links are still hidden in the archives and await
its discovery, in the worst case they are lost for ever. Just with a sufficient correct image of the
trade relations of the Florentine families, their power structure can be revealed. Rather to wait
for these discoveries, we impose in the course some additional gravity on the player nodes while
considering again the net-wealth data and combined families ties in the hope to get a sharper
image of the real power structure.
7.1 Including the Net-Wealth into the Network Structure
To this end let us introduce again the net-wealth values into the network structure. For doing so,
the adjusted array of net-wealth values is given by
w3w = (0, 0, 55, 44, 20, 32, 8, 42, 103, 48, 49, 0, 10, 0, 48),
to which we refer to as w3w. Finally, we need just to apply a single majority rule, that is given
by the subsequent quorum q3w = 230. Apparently, the undirected graph G3 remains unaltered.
Hence, the modified weighted majority graph problem based on Graph 3 is specified by
wMP3w := (G3, w3w, q3w).
To the associated simple game is referred to as 〈N, v3w〉.
14The business links reported by Breiger and Pattison (1986, p. 218) are primarily based on loans. However, the
usury ban by the Catholic church made a loan to an illicit transaction, since usury was strictly defined as
everything that exceeds the principal, for instance, the face value of a loan. Therefore, even a sufficiently small
interest rate on a loan was considered as usury preventing the loaner of salvation and damned him to eternal
purgatory. The practical consequence was that a loan was a gratuitous contract ruling out interest rates and
offering therefore no profit margin. Nevertheless, it was considered as legitimate to receive compensation letting
bankers to rely on the means of exchange by bills. A bill was a request of payment to another place and currency
due at a fixed date, though it was exposed to the risk of price fluctuations not only between currencies, but also
between gold and silver. The price of the bill can be regarded as the interest rate. In the accounting books,
one does not find in general any traces of loans or discount rates rather of exchange transactions (cf. de Roover
(1966, pp. 10-14)). This practice makes it quite difficult to discover a business relation that is based on loans.
Apparently more difficult than to identify a marriage tie.
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A synopsis of the results is grasped in Table 9.9. Here, we restrict ourselves on those solutions
that provide highest variances. These are the Johnston index with a value of 138.61 and the
pre-nucleolus having a variance of 190.47. For the other solution concepts the power distribution
is clustered too close around the mean indicating no outstanding position with the consequence
that we dismiss them. For convenience sake, we present the power distribution of the Johnston
index that is given by
φJI(N, v3w) = (0, 0, 0.2927, 0.0124, 0.0221, 0.0646, 0.0027, 0.0216, 0.3986,
0.0603, 0.0599, 0, 0.0048, 0, 0.0603).
It orders now the Medici on first, the Barbadori on second, and the Ginori on third. All of
those are marked as outstanding due to the obtained variance. This ranking neither preserves the
ranking of the net-wealth distribution nor it reflects in any way the annals, except for the Medici,
and with some limitations for the Barbadori. Contrasted to the foregoing study, the Barbadori
family lose their central position, they are not anymore an inevitable actor. The Medici do not
take over their role either, though they now overshadow the Barbadori. This lets us turn to
the pre-kernel and pre-nucleolus. This game has neither a homogeneous representation nor a
veto-player, however, applying the method proposed by Meinhardt (2014), we find out that the
pre-kernel is single-valued and coincides with the pre-nucleolus. Hence, it is given by
PK (v3w) = ν
∗(N, v3w) = {(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)/3},
This distribution identifies the same major protagonists as the Johnston index, which are the
Medici, Barbadori, and the Ginori, all with equal strength. Again, we cannot discover any link
to the annals with the consequence that we do not consider this distribution as an image of the
main historical actors, except for the Medici, and with some limitations for the Barbadori, but
not for the Ginori. Their role seems to be overvalued by the weighted majority graph problem
wMP3w. Hence, we infer that wMP3w does not correctly depict the Florentine power structure.
7.2 Including the Combined Ties into the Network Structure
For proceeding our analysis, we need to correct the combined number of business and marriage
ties across the 116 families into the network while assigning the null-players with a zero value.
The corrected array of the combined number of ties is given by
w3t = (0, 0, 14, 9, 18, 9, 14, 14, 54, 7, 32, 0, 5, 0, 7),
adjusting then the simple majority rule to set the quorum q3t to 92. And notifying that the
undirected graph G3 remains unaltered. Hence, the modified weighted majority graph problem
based on Graph 3 is specified by wMP3t := (G3, w3t, q3t). Within this subsection, we referring to
the associated simple game as 〈N, v3t〉.
We present a summary of the results in Table 9.10. Similar to the foregoing analysis we restrict
ourselves on those solutions that provide highest variances. These are the Shapley-Shubik index
with a value of 154.15 and the pre-nucleolus with a variance of 666.6667. The other solution
concepts are dismissed, because their distributions are again clustered too close around the mean
that does not assign to any actor an outstanding position.
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φSSI(N, v3t) = (0.4679, 0.0179, 0.0896, 0.0274, 0.0274, 0.0310, 0.1964,
0.0095, 0.1202, 0.0000, 0.0060, 0.0000, 0.0095).
This distribution establishes that the Barbadori are on first, the second are the Medici, followed
by the Peruzzi. By the variance, to all of them prominent roles are assigned. Analogously to the
findings for a pre-kernel element of game v2t, the Peruzzi are again assigned with a dominant role
w.r.t. the power distribution, though their power is not as strong as for the mentioned games and
solution concept. Remarkable is that the Barbadori considerably overshadow all others actors.
This prominence is not covered by the annals, though they again occupy a central position within
weighted majority graph problem wMP3t implying that their power attribution should not be
surprising. In particular under the consideration that one can attribute to them veto power
making them to an inevitable player. This lets us infer that a pre-kernel element must assign
to them the whole spoil. Due to Meinhardt (2014), this assertion can be extended to the whole
pre-kernel and pre-nucleolus despite non-homogeneity, hence both solutions coincide. Its single-
valuedness is quantified by the point
PK (v3t) = ν
∗(N, v3t) = {(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)},
Once again, the Barbadori got a prominent place that is not supported by the chronicles.
Concluding that the modified weighted majority graph problem based on Graph 3 is too stylized
to get a correct image of the real power distribution. Thus, the imposed additional structure by
the cumulated number of business and marriage ties are not sufficient to sharpen the image. We
regard the mesh of business relations characterized by Graph 3 as too coarse for identifying the
main protagonists, too many business links are missing, for instance those of the Strozzi or even
of the Alberti or Rucellai and many others never mentioned in the underlying data set. But,
nevertheless, they are crucial actors in the Florentine business network.
8 Concluding Remarks
The network structure provided by the Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are based on a reduced data set of 16
families of a basic population of 215 leading Florentine families. It can therefore only represent
an extremely simplified and vestigial image of the real family ties among the oligarchs. From each
of these stylized network structures a weighted majority graph problem is derived to embed the
mesh of relations within a political decision-making process. This allows us to conduct a power
analysis while referring to several solution concepts with the purpose to disentangle the power
structure and retrieving the main protagonists from the annals. Three different voting scenarios
have been studied, namely a marriage network without an à priori union, a marriage network
with an à priori union, and finally a business network. The reference setting for each of these
voting scenarios are based on a symmetric control of the share of votes for each family. Later the
settings were extended to take account for asymmetries by the consideration of the net-wealth
data and the cumulative ties across the families.
As it turns out, the pre-kernel – as a solution concept designed for studying bargaining sit-
uations – performed best in retrieving the leading actors from the chronicles. This is mainly
caused by its generic set-valuedness with the effect that it is offering therefore a wide range of
political settlements to balance the interests among the negotiating parties, which was ideal for
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a milieu where the political institutions were exactly designed for that purpose. Secondly, by the
desirability property, it assigns the highest spoil to the party with strongest negotiation power
and does not cluster the power mainly around the mean, as it is the case for the power indices
to satisfy the principle of equality. This allows to single out those actors who have the greatest
influence to determine the outcome of a political decision making process.
9 Appendix
This section is devoted to summarize the different parameter settings as well as the derived results.
In particular, Table 9.1 provides the parameter settings for every weighted majority graph problem
from which the associated simple games are obtained, whereas the other tables retrieve the results
of all point solutions. The various pre-kernel solutions are not once more listed.
Table 9.1: Parameter Settings
Parameter
Values Prob.a
wMP1 wMP1w wMP1t wMP2 wMP2w wMP2t wMP3 wMP3w wMP3t
Graphb G1 G1 G1 G2 G2 G2 G3 G3 G3
01 ACCIAIUOLc 1 10 2 1 10 2 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZIc 1 36 3 1 44 17 0 0 0
03 BARBADORIc 1 55 14 1 55 14 1 55 14
04 BISCHERIc 1 44 9 1 44 9 1 44 9
05 CASTELLANc 1 20 18 1 20 18 1 20 18
06 GINORIc 1 32 9 1 32 9 1 32 9
07 GUADAGNIc 1 8 14 0 0 0 1 8 14
08 LAMBERTESc 1 42 14 1 42 14 1 42 14
09 MEDICIc 1 103 54 1 103 54 1 103 54
10 PAZZIc 1 48 7 1 48 7 1 48 7
11 PERUZZIc 1 49 32 1 49 32 1 49 32
12 RIDOLFIc 1 27 4 1 27 4 0 0 0
13 SALVIATIc 1 10 5 1 10 5 1 10 5
14 STROZZIc 1 146 29 1 146 29 0 0 0
15 TORNABUONc 1 48 7 1 48 7 1 48 7
qd 8 340 111 8 340 111 6 230 92
Gamee v1 v1w v1t v2 v2w v2t v3 v3w v3t




e Derived Simple Game
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Table 9.2: Solution Matrix of Game v1
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0520 0.0595 0.0520 0.0231 0.0275 0.0364 0.0333
02 ALBIZZI 0.0879 0.0720 0.0879 0.0881 0.0835 0.0891 0.1000
03 BARBADORI 0.0721 0.0676 0.0721 0.0615 0.0657 0.0707 0.0667
04 BISCHERI 0.0735 0.0680 0.0735 0.0627 0.0706 0.0725 0.0667
05 CASTELLAN 0.0647 0.0667 0.0647 0.0547 0.0656 0.0668 0.0667
06 GINORI 0.0374 0.0577 0.0374 0.0181 0.0246 0.0285 0.0333
07 GUADAGNI 0.0914 0.0758 0.0914 0.1238 0.1255 0.1053 0.1000
08 LAMBERTES 0.0389 0.0583 0.0389 0.0198 0.0278 0.0311 0.0333
09 MEDICI 0.1179 0.0895 0.1179 0.2744 0.1988 0.1635 0.1500
10 PAZZI 0.0271 0.0552 0.0271 0.0116 0.0142 0.0182 0.0333
11 PERUZZI 0.0561 0.0623 0.0561 0.0331 0.0442 0.0483 0.0667
12 RIDOLFI 0.0727 0.0688 0.0727 0.0676 0.0740 0.0755 0.0667
13 SALVIATI 0.0697 0.0638 0.0697 0.0470 0.0432 0.0546 0.0500
14 STROZZI 0.0730 0.0686 0.0730 0.0646 0.0733 0.0748 0.0667
15 TORNABUON 0.0656 0.0662 0.0656 0.0498 0.0614 0.0648 0.0667
a Holler/Public Good Index






Table 9.3: Solution Matrix of Game v1w
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0335 0.0547 0.0312 0.0033 0.0050 0.0059 0.0094
02 ALBIZZI 0.0871 0.0639 0.0856 0.0380 0.0507 0.0525 0.0849
03 BARBADORI 0.0780 0.0694 0.0773 0.0689 0.0841 0.0805 0.0943
04 BISCHERI 0.0835 0.0682 0.0831 0.0609 0.0761 0.0742 0.0566
05 CASTELLAN 0.0664 0.0673 0.0667 0.0588 0.0680 0.0700 0.0189
06 GINORI 0.0390 0.0565 0.0361 0.0082 0.0149 0.0150 0.0094
07 GUADAGNI 0.0945 0.0680 0.0909 0.0637 0.0840 0.0733 0.0566
08 LAMBERTES 0.0524 0.0581 0.0497 0.0129 0.0215 0.0230 0.0189
09 MEDICI 0.1115 0.0890 0.1146 0.2304 0.1891 0.1801 0.1981
10 PAZZI 0.0378 0.0560 0.0351 0.0069 0.0118 0.0125 0.0189
11 PERUZZI 0.0640 0.0623 0.0636 0.0291 0.0411 0.0444 0.0755
12 RIDOLFI 0.0731 0.0751 0.0777 0.1165 0.1035 0.1093 0.0566
13 SALVIATI 0.0615 0.0571 0.0577 0.0113 0.0174 0.0184 0.0189
14 STROZZI 0.0500 0.0898 0.0628 0.2516 0.1774 0.1840 0.2075
15 TORNABUON 0.0676 0.0647 0.0679 0.0395 0.0553 0.0568 0.0755
a Holler/Public Good Index
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Table 9.4: Solution Matrix of Game v1t
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0281 0.0548 0.0255 0.0015 0.0023 0.0030 0
02 ALBIZZI 0.0965 0.0615 0.0935 0.0268 0.0372 0.0388 0.0488
03 BARBADORI 0.0763 0.0717 0.0772 0.0880 0.0888 0.0937 0.0732
04 BISCHERI 0.0741 0.0664 0.0747 0.0522 0.0646 0.0652 0.0488
05 CASTELLAN 0.0494 0.0717 0.0522 0.0866 0.0928 0.0937 0.0976
06 GINORI 0.0505 0.0565 0.0463 0.0060 0.0121 0.0119 0.0244
07 GUADAGNI 0.1033 0.0716 0.1032 0.0801 0.1032 0.0931 0.1098
08 LAMBERTES 0.0494 0.0582 0.0466 0.0118 0.0250 0.0210 0.0366
09 MEDICI 0.1201 0.0984 0.1263 0.3405 0.2468 0.2378 0.2683
10 PAZZI 0.0337 0.0555 0.0306 0.0031 0.0052 0.0063 0
11 PERUZZI 0.0224 0.0676 0.0243 0.0582 0.0721 0.0717 0.0732
12 RIDOLFI 0.0864 0.0697 0.0877 0.0804 0.0785 0.0831 0.0244
13 SALVIATI 0.0651 0.0568 0.0618 0.0076 0.0109 0.0136 0
14 STROZZI 0.0718 0.0778 0.0794 0.1297 0.1207 0.1264 0.1463
15 TORNABUON 0.0730 0.0619 0.0708 0.0275 0.0398 0.0408 0.0488
a Holler/Public Good Index






Table 9.5: Solution Matrix of Game v2
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0581 0.0643 0.0581 0.0282 0.0332 0.0436 0.0357
02 ALBIZZI 0.1114 0.0881 0.1114 0.1910 0.1538 0.1364 0.1429
03 BARBADORI 0.0745 0.0720 0.0745 0.0599 0.0681 0.0735 0.0714
04 BISCHERI 0.0788 0.0731 0.0788 0.0664 0.0736 0.0780 0.0714
05 CASTELLAN 0.0673 0.0713 0.0673 0.0562 0.0772 0.0708 0.0714
06 GINORI 0.0532 0.0634 0.0532 0.0259 0.0339 0.0400 0.0357
07 GUADAGNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0532 0.0634 0.0532 0.0259 0.0339 0.0400 0.0357
09 MEDICI 0.1199 0.0956 0.1199 0.2749 0.2003 0.1653 0.1607
10 PAZZI 0.0347 0.0591 0.0347 0.0152 0.0175 0.0236 0.0357
11 PERUZZI 0.0622 0.0675 0.0622 0.0383 0.0515 0.0560 0.0714
12 RIDOLFI 0.0722 0.0720 0.0722 0.0594 0.0724 0.0738 0.0714
13 SALVIATI 0.0794 0.0705 0.0794 0.0623 0.0558 0.0679 0.0536
14 STROZZI 0.0728 0.0721 0.0728 0.0593 0.0751 0.0741 0.0714
15 TORNABUON 0.0622 0.0677 0.0622 0.0372 0.0536 0.0569 0.0714
a Holler/Public Good Index
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Table 9.6: Solution Matrix of Game v2w
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0320 0.0584 0.0294 0.0028 0.0039 0.0050 0
02 ALBIZZI 0.1178 0.0812 0.1168 0.1223 0.1308 0.1209 0.1290
03 BARBADORI 0.0822 0.0724 0.0808 0.0624 0.0782 0.0763 0.0968
04 BISCHERI 0.0913 0.0756 0.0925 0.0843 0.0905 0.0928 0.0645
05 CASTELLAN 0.0667 0.0696 0.0660 0.0487 0.0620 0.0621 0.0323
06 GINORI 0.0521 0.0618 0.0485 0.0131 0.0198 0.0224 0.0161
07 GUADAGNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0557 0.0628 0.0532 0.0167 0.0237 0.0275 0.0161
09 MEDICI 0.1251 0.0917 0.1276 0.2119 0.1833 0.1744 0.2151
10 PAZZI 0.0402 0.0598 0.0364 0.0069 0.0115 0.0125 0.0215
11 PERUZZI 0.0648 0.0666 0.0647 0.0312 0.0433 0.0469 0.0645
12 RIDOLFI 0.0813 0.0775 0.0842 0.1032 0.1011 0.1023 0.0323
13 SALVIATI 0.0639 0.0610 0.0587 0.0111 0.0163 0.0182 0.0215
14 STROZZI 0.0612 0.0941 0.0750 0.2501 0.1865 0.1865 0.2258
15 TORNABUON 0.0658 0.0677 0.0660 0.0353 0.0491 0.0523 0.0645
a Holler/Public Good Index






Table 9.7: Solution Matrix of Game v2t
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0.0302 0.0589 0.0272 0.0018 0.0030 0.0035 0
02 ALBIZZI 0.1317 0.0821 0.1330 0.1255 0.1345 0.1289 0.1739
03 BARBADORI 0.0854 0.0755 0.0862 0.0855 0.0891 0.0934 0.0870
04 BISCHERI 0.0872 0.0725 0.0876 0.0669 0.0744 0.0771 0.0435
05 CASTELLAN 0.0552 0.0742 0.0586 0.0739 0.0854 0.0862 0.0870
06 GINORI 0.0587 0.0615 0.0546 0.0096 0.0169 0.0180 0.0217
07 GUADAGNI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0641 0.0635 0.0608 0.0171 0.0317 0.0287 0.0217
09 MEDICI 0.1263 0.1041 0.1345 0.3525 0.2524 0.2482 0.2609
10 PAZZI 0.0320 0.0595 0.0290 0.0034 0.0058 0.0068 0
11 PERUZZI 0.0302 0.0720 0.0320 0.0589 0.0753 0.0744 0.0870
12 RIDOLFI 0.0854 0.0723 0.0843 0.0689 0.0741 0.0759 0.0435
13 SALVIATI 0.0641 0.0609 0.0602 0.0084 0.0120 0.0146 0
14 STROZZI 0.0765 0.0803 0.0837 0.1141 0.1183 0.1195 0.1304
15 TORNABUON 0.0730 0.0628 0.0683 0.0134 0.0271 0.0248 0.0435
a Holler/Public Good Index
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Table 9.8: Solution Matrix of Game v3
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
03 BARBADORI 0.1667 0.1345 0.1667 0.3745 0.4276 0.2581 1.0000
04 BISCHERI 0.0718 0.0818 0.0718 0.0388 0.0435 0.0560 0
05 CASTELLAN 0.0949 0.0926 0.0949 0.0781 0.0792 0.0973 0
06 GINORI 0.0718 0.0841 0.0718 0.0419 0.0522 0.0649 0
07 GUADAGNI 0.0486 0.0780 0.0486 0.0267 0.0355 0.0413 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0949 0.0880 0.0949 0.0614 0.0585 0.0796 0
09 MEDICI 0.1528 0.1129 0.1528 0.1983 0.1419 0.1755 0
10 PAZZI 0.0602 0.0765 0.0602 0.0229 0.0224 0.0354 0
11 PERUZZI 0.1181 0.0987 0.1181 0.1117 0.0943 0.1209 0
12 RIDOLFI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 SALVIATI 0.0602 0.0765 0.0602 0.0229 0.0224 0.0354 0
14 STROZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 TORNABUON 0.0602 0.0765 0.0602 0.0229 0.0224 0.0354 0
a Holler/Public Good Index






Table 9.9: Solution Matrix of Game v3w
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
03 BARBADORI 0.2045 0.1255 0.2070 0.2927 0.2575 0.2561 0.3333
04 BISCHERI 0.0455 0.0764 0.0412 0.0124 0.0333 0.0218 0
05 CASTELLAN 0.1023 0.0787 0.0930 0.0221 0.0230 0.0327 0
06 GINORI 0.0795 0.0913 0.0807 0.0646 0.1008 0.0926 0.3333
07 GUADAGNI 0.0114 0.0730 0.0088 0.0027 0.0060 0.0054 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0909 0.0793 0.0833 0.0216 0.0417 0.0354 0
09 MEDICI 0.1932 0.1369 0.2026 0.3986 0.3171 0.3106 0.3333
10 PAZZI 0.0682 0.0890 0.0737 0.0603 0.0746 0.0817 0
11 PERUZZI 0.0909 0.0873 0.0939 0.0599 0.0667 0.0736 0
12 RIDOLFI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 SALVIATI 0.0455 0.0736 0.0421 0.0048 0.0048 0.0082 0
14 STROZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 TORNABUON 0.0682 0.0890 0.0737 0.0603 0.0746 0.0817 0
a Holler/Public Good Index







Table 9.10: Solution Matrix of Game v3t
Family
Power Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 ACCIAIUOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
02 ALBIZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
03 BARBADORI 0.2083 0.1434 0.2200 0.4208 0.4679 0.3395 1.0000
04 BISCHERI 0.0625 0.0756 0.0500 0.0091 0.0179 0.0185 0
05 CASTELLAN 0.1458 0.0965 0.1533 0.0958 0.0869 0.1173 0
06 GINORI 0.1042 0.0782 0.0917 0.0167 0.0274 0.0309 0
07 GUADAGNI 0.0625 0.0782 0.0533 0.0170 0.0274 0.0309 0
08 LAMBERTES 0.0833 0.0795 0.0783 0.0215 0.0310 0.0370 0
09 MEDICI 0.1250 0.1252 0.1500 0.2723 0.1964 0.2531 0
10 PAZZI 0.0417 0.0743 0.0417 0.0076 0.0095 0.0123 0
11 PERUZZI 0.1042 0.1017 0.1033 0.1287 0.1202 0.1420 0
12 RIDOLFI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 SALVIATI 0.0208 0.0730 0.0167 0.0030 0.0060 0.0062 0
14 STROZZI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 TORNABUON 0.0417 0.0743 0.0417 0.0076 0.0095 0.0123 0
a Holler/Public Good Index






Table 9.11: Variances of Power Distributionh
Game
Variance Solution
PGIa MPGIb DPIc JHId SSIe BZFf PNg
01 v1 5.2618 0.7184 5.2618 41.6818 21.3984 12.8957 9.9206
02 v1w 4.9081 1.1983 5.2355 59.6757 31.6523 30.7726 38.8377
03 v1t 7.9173 1.2885 8.7435 72.8866 39.5512 37.4060 49.0496
04 v2 8.0080 4.2793 8.0080 51.8961 25.9732 16.6757 16.6120
05 v2w 9.8711 4.6124 10.5750 58.9851 37.7435 34.6968 51.8557
06 v2t 12.5372 4.7833 13.8096 80.3623 45.1758 43.7429 55.6756
07 v3 28.5234 19.7285 28.5234 100.5857 115.9110 52.8755 666.6667
08 v3w 42.4046 20.4917 44.6929 138.6146 92.3996 89.7715 190.4762
09 v3t 38.5665 21.3400 44.3254 151.0825 154.1505 107.5185 666.6667
a Holler/Public Good Index






h Normalized to 100
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